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Roll (1988) finds that idiosyncratic influences strongly dominate systematic influences in 
stock returns. However, it is extensively debated that whether the prevailing idiosyncratic 
influences are due to firm-specific information or noise. In this paper, I empirically 
address this question by examining the contribution of the proxies of private information, 
public information and noise to the cross-sectional variation of idiosyncratic volatility. 
My empirical findings suggest that private information incorporated in the prices strongly 
dominates public information and noise in driving the variation of idiosyncratic volatility. 
Furthermore, the explanatory power of noise for idiosyncratic volatility decreases with 
the horizon over which returns are measured. The findings in this paper support the 
information-based interpretation of idiosyncratic volatility that prices of stocks with 
greater idiosyncratic volatility are more informative.  
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Idiosyncratic Volatility: Information or Noise? 
 
1. Introduction 
The significant role of firm-specific influences in return volatility has long been 
recognized in the literature. Roll (1988) points out that systematic influences account for 
only a very limited portion of individual stocks’ return variance.1 Even more strikingly, 
there is only a trivial increase in the explanatory power of systematic influences after the 
exclusion of the dates with firm specific news release.2  Collectively, these evidences 
indicate that most of the individual stocks’ return variance is due to either private 
information or ‘occasional frenzy unrelated to concrete information’ as suggested by Roll 
(1988). Corroboratively, Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001) find a secular increase 
in idiosyncratic volatility relative to systematic volatility in the US from 1962 to 1997. 
However, it is not clear whether the prevailing idiosyncratic influences in stock returns 
are due to firm-specific information or noise. Motivated by this debate, in this paper I aim 
to investigate the role and the relative importance of information versus noise in 
explaining idiosyncratic volatility in the cross section.  
One strand of prior research suggests that it is the firm-specific information which 
drives the variation of idiosyncratic volatility. Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) find that R2 
from the market model of returns is significantly lower in markets with developed 
financial systems and better property rights protection. They argue that better property 
                                                 
1 For a sample of 2030 individual stocks listed on NYSE and AMEX, the average R2 is 0.179 for the fit of 
CAPM to monthly returns during the sample period September 1982 to August 1987. The average R2 is 
significantly lower if daily returns are fitted.  
2 Sophisticated investors may gather private information and trade on it before the news announcements, 
which could explain the lack of significant improvement of model fit after excluding news dates since the 
information content of news releases has already been incorporated into prices via informed trading. 
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rights protection would encourage sophisticated investors to gather private information 
and trade on it. Thus idiosyncratic volatility is higher in developed markets due to the 
incorporation of firm-specific private information into prices via informed trading, which 
drives down R2 from the market model of returns.3 The role of information in explaining 
idiosyncratic volatility in the cross section is indirectly supported by the empirical finding 
in Durnev, Morck, Yeung and Zarowin (2003) that current returns contain more 
information about future earnings for firms and industries with greater idiosyncratic 
volatility. The above papers have prompted several follow-up papers to use idiosyncratic 
volatility as a proxy for firm-specific information incorporated in prices to address 
various issues in finance and accounting (e.g., Chan and Hameed, 2006; Chen, Goldstein 
and Jiang, 2006; Daouk, Lee and Ng, 2006; Durnev, Morck and Yeung, 2004; and 
Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; among others).4  
A second strand of research challenges the predominance of information in 
determining idiosyncratic volatility. Ashbaugh-Skaife, Gassen and LaFond (2006) 
replicate the analysis in Durnev et al (2003) and conduct additional tests examining the 
relation between idiosyncratic volatility and the information environment proxies in six 
major equity markets. Their findings are either opposite to or inconsistent with the 
argument that higher idiosyncratic volatility is due to more firm-specific information 
                                                 
3 Jin and Myers (2006) interpret higher R2s in the less developed markets from a different perspective. They 
argue that the imperfect information and opaqueness transfer the firm-specific risks from investors to the 
insiders and thus increase R2s. Although differing in the mechanism, they also view high R2s as resulting 
from the lack of firm-specific information incorporated in prices.  
4 Idiosyncratic volatility and the related measures are used to study the production of market versus firm-
specific information by analysts in emerging markets by Chan and Hameed (2006), the relation between the 
price informativeness and the sensitivity of corporate investment to stock price by Chen, Goldstein and 
Jiang (2006), the link between capital market governance and the market pricing efficiency by Daouk, Lee 
and Ng (2006), the relation between informativeness of stock prices and the efficiency of corporate 
investment by Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004), and the influence of analysts, institutional investors and 
insiders on the incorporation of different sources of information into stock prices by Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2004), among others.  
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contained in stock prices. Kelly (2007) arrives at similar conclusion based on market 
microstructure based test. He shows that stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility are 
characterized by higher information costs and greater impediments to informed trading. A 
follow-up study by Griffin, Kelly and Nardari (2007) fails to find an association, which is 
documented in Morck et al (2000), between idiosyncratic volatility and proxies of the 
quality of institutions in countries. Further contradictory evidences are found by Teoh, 
Yang and Zhang (2006) and Hou, Peng and Xiong (2006). Both of these two papers show 
that firms with higher idiosyncratic volatility are associated with more pronounced return 
anomalies, lower earnings quality and greater investors’ cognition bias, which is 
inconsistent with the notion that information plays a prominent role in determining 
idiosyncratic volatility. Finally, there are some studies that suggest a significant but non-
monotonic relation between idiosyncratic volatility and the information contained in 
prices.5  
The central issue in this debate is which component of price innovations, 
information or noise, is the dominant factor driving the cross-sectional variation of 
idiosyncratic volatility.  To address this issue, I first measure the amount of private 
information, public information and noise incorporated in prices by applying the 
Beveridge-Nelson random-walk decomposition method to quoted prices. Similar 
procedure is used by Hasbrouck (1991, 1993) to study the informativeness of trades and 
the magnitude of pricing error respectively. I first validate the information proxies 
obtained from the above model by relating them with an ex-ante proxy of information 
                                                 
5 Sudipto, Gan and Gao (2006) argue that stocks with prices more informative about future events may 
have lower idiosyncratic volatility in the future since there is less surprise or new information when the 
events actually occur. Lee and Liu (2007) suggest that there may be a U-shape relationship between 
idiosyncratic volatility and price informativeness of trades.  
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flow, the frequency of firm-specific news releases via major financial news service 
providers, www.MarketWatch.com. There exists a strongly positive correlation between 
the model-based information proxies and the ex-ante proxy of information flow. This 
gives me some assurance that the information metrics obtained from the Beveridge-
Nelson decomposition are valid.  
After obtaining the proxies of private information, public information and noise 
from the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition, I compare the explanatory powers of these 
three variables for idiosyncratic volatility using a sample of 18,464 firm-year 
observations of 2680 NYSE common stocks from 1993 to 2005. I document the 
following results. First, private information, public information and noise all contribute 
significantly to the cross-sectional variation of idiosyncratic volatility. Second, the 
measure of private information strongly dominates the measures of public information 
and noise in explaining the variation of idiosyncratic volatility. Third, the explanatory 
power of noise decreases or even becomes insignificant when return is measured over 
longer horizon such as week and month, but the information proxies, especially private 
information, are still strongly related with idiosyncratic volatility. The findings are robust 
across different sample periods, firm size groups, and different methods to estimate 
idiosyncratic volatility. Collectively, the empirical findings in this paper support the 
argument that the variation of idiosyncratic volatility in the cross section mainly reflects 
the different amount of private information incorporated in prices, while noise in prices 
plays a limited role in explaining idiosyncratic volatility, especially when returns are 
measured over long horizons.  
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This paper directly addresses whether the cross sectional difference of 
idiosyncratic volatility is due to firm-specific information or noise. The answer to this 
question helps us understand the answered question raised in Roll (1988), i.e., what 
idiosyncratic influences drive price movements. The empirical findings in this paper 
show that the amount of private information is the dominant factor driving the cross-
sectional variation of idiosyncratic volatility. The findings in this paper also shed some 
light on the debate whether firms with greater idiosyncratic volatility have more 
informative prices. The argument for more informative price of firms with greater 
idiosyncratic volatility relies critically on that idiosyncratic volatility arises due to the 
incorporation of firm-specific information into prices rather than noise. The findings in 
this study imply that stocks with greater idiosyncratic volatility have more firm-specific 
information in addition to systematic information incorporated into prices. In this sense, 
greater idiosyncratic volatility implies more informative price. 
Some of previous studies, such as Ashbaugh-Skaife et al (2006), Kelly (2007) and 
Griffin et al (2007), arrive at the opposite conclusion that prices of stocks with greater 
idiosyncratic volatility are less informative. However, all these studies are based on 
indirect tests about the relation between idiosyncratic volatility and price informativeness. 
They try to relate idiosyncratic volatility to some firm characteristics which are supposed 
to capture price informativeness. However, the key issue in the debate is whether the 
variation of idiosyncratic volatility across firms is due to the different amount of 
information or noise incorporated in stock prices. The approach adopted in this study has 
the following advantages. First, it directly compares the relative explanatory powers of 
information and noise for idiosyncratic volatility. Second, the proxies of information and 
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noise are derived from stock prices under the same return decomposition framework. So 
these proxies would contain similar degrees of measurement error and capture the actual 
amount of information and noise in stock prices, if the return decomposition technique is 
appropriate.  
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: section 2 describes the methodology; 
section 3 describes the sample and data used in the analyses; section 4 validates the 
model-based information proxies by relating them to an exogenous measure of 
information flow; section 5 reports the empirical results of comparing the explanatory 
powers of private information, public information and noise for idiosyncratic volatility; 
section 6 discusses the results; and finally section 7 concludes.  
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2. Methodology 
2.1 The measurement of idiosyncratic volatility 
Idiosyncratic volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the residuals from 
the market model. For each stock, a time-series regression of stock returns against the 
lead, contemporaneous and lag market returns is run as in Eq. (1),  
,
L
i t i il m t l i tl L
R R , ,α β −=−= + +∑ ε
                                                
, (1) 
where Rm,t is the value-weighted market return computed from all common stocks traded 
on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. Since large firms normally dominate small ones in the 
calculation of value-weighted market return, idiosyncratic volatility calculated from the 
above regression could be superficially biased downward for large firms if the firm return 
on the left hand side of the regression is included in the calculation of market return. To 
avoid such bias, the firm’s return is excluded from the calculation of market return to 
estimate idiosyncratic volatility for a specific firm.6 The results are basically unchanged 
if firm returns on the left hand side of the regression are included in the calculation of 
market returns. Lead and lag market returns are included to allow for the different speeds 
of adjustment to market influences as in Dimson (1979), but the results are qualitatively 
similar if only the contemporaneous market return is included. The standard deviation of 
residuals is taken as the measure of idiosyncratic volatility (IV). Idiosyncratic volatility 
could be measured via the above procedure over various frequencies. In most analyses in 
this study, I focus on idiosyncratic volatility estimated from the regression using daily 
returns and including two lag and two leading market returns. Each year I estimate a 
 
6 To further avoid the spurious relation between idiosyncratic volatility and firm size, I also conduct sub-
sample analysis by firm size and use equally-weighted market return in the market model to estimate 
idiosyncratic volatility in the robustness tests. 
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yearly measure of IV for every firm using its daily data in that year. For comparative 
study of idiosyncratic volatility measured over different time horizons, I also conduct the 
analyses using idiosyncratic volatility estimated from weekly and monthly returns.  
 
2.2 Model-based proxies of private information, public information and noise 
A stock’s price could be viewed as comprising of two components: the stock’s 
fundamental value, which depends on the discounted value of future expected payoffs, 
and the value-irrelevant transitory noise. We may term the first component as the 
(implicit) efficient price and the second component simply as noise. Price responds 
noisily to new information arriving at the market. The price accumulates the information 
content of the sequential information arrivals and thus is a non-stationary series in the 
statistical sense. Beveridge and Nelson (1981) develop an econometric technique to 
decompose a non-stationary time series into a random-walk component and a transitory 
component. If information is assumed to arrive at the market independently, then the 
random-walk component of price is the underlying efficient price and the transitory 
component is the noise in price. Further, the efficient price changes could be due to either 
new private information, which is known only to various informed investors, or new 
public information, which is known to all investors. 7 Since private information could 
only be incorporated into prices via trading by informed investors while public 
                                                 
7 A differentiation between public information and public news event is necessary here. In this paper, 
public information is defined as the piece of information on which investors agree. While a public news 
event could be known to every investor, investors may not agree on its information content. For example, 
IBM announces quarterly earnings of $1 per share which is $0.1 higher than the market consensus. If 
investors agree on the implication of the announced earnings about the firm’s future performance, then the 
earnings surprise is new public information which would be reflected in stock prices immediately. However, 
if investors have their own private interpretations about the firm’s fundamentals from the announced 
earnings, the public earnings announcement actually generates private information which could be reflected 
in stock prices via trading.  
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information would be reflected in prices directly without trading, the trading-related 
efficient price change could be attributed to private information, while the trading-
unrelated efficient price change could be attributed to public information.8 Based on this 
line of logic, Hasbrouck (1991, 1993) applies the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition 
method to stock prices to study the information content of trades and the degree of 
pricing errors respectively. In this study, I apply the same decomposition method as that 
in Hasbrouck (1991) to the quoted prices to measure private information, public 
information and noise. In the following sections, I will briefly illustrate the principles and 
the procedure of decomposition. More details could be found in Hasbrouck (1991, 1993) 
and Beveridge and Nelson (1981).  
 The logarithm of the midpoint of quoted price is assumed to be the sum of two 







= + ,  (2) 
where st is a transitory component with E(st) = 0 and E(st2)= σs2, and mt is a random-walk 
component with E(wt) = 0, E(wt2) = σw2, and E(wtwτ) = 0 for τ ≠ t. The random-walk 
component has a natural interpretation as the unobservable efficient price and the 
transitory component as pricing error or noise in the quoted price.  
Both wt and st are unobservable innovations, and to link them with the observable 
data, the following VAR model of price innovation, rt = pt – pt-1, and vector xt which 
contains trading-related information, is assumed, 
                                                 
8 If every investor knows a specific piece of information, then the price would respond immediately to the 
information. Non-information based trading such as portfolio reallocation or exogenous liquidity trading 
could also induce price changes, but those changes would be reflected in transitory noise component rather 
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where error terms v1,t and v2,t are zero-mean and serially uncorrelated disturbances with 
Var(v1,t) = σ12, Var(v2,t) = Ω and E(v1,tv2,t) = 0. It is worth noting that the 
contemporaneous trading variables enter the equation of price change but not the vice 
versa, because it is reasonable to assume that trading drives the change in prices. The 
VAR model seems to be somewhat arbitrary, but it is sufficient to capture the dynamics 
between trading and prices implied in some general structural models of price 
evolvement as illustrated in Hasbrouck (1991). A VMA representation about rt and xt 
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Based on the VMA representation of the price change rt, the price could be decomposed 
into the random walk component and the stationary component applying the Beveridge-
Nelson decomposition of non-stationary series,  
1
1 * *
1, 2, 1, 2,0 0 0 0
(1 )
(1 ) [( ) ( ) ] ( )
j
t t
i t t i t i j t ji j i j
p L r
L a v b v Av B v
−
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞−
− −= = = =
= −
= − + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ , (5) 
















∑ . (6) 
Mapping Eq. (5) to Eq. (2), the random-walk component could be interpreted as the 
efficient price mt, and the stationary component as the pricing error st.   
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 Based on Eq. (5), the variances of efficient price change and transitory pricing 
errors could be estimated from the observable data such as quote revisions and trading-
related variables. The variance of the efficient price change wt could be calculated as in 
the following way,  
2 2 2
* ' * * 2 2
10 0 0
( ) ( ) ( )
w wx wo
j j ij j i
b b a
σ σ σ
σ∞ ∞ ∞= = =
= +
= Ω +∑ ∑ ∑ . (7) 
 
The variance of trading-related component of efficient price change, σwx2, could be 
interpreted as the amount of private information reflected in prices, and the variance of 
trading-unrelated component of efficient price change, σwo2, could be used as the proxy of 
other value-relevant public information. The variance of pricing error st could also be 
expressed in terms of disturbances of quote revisions and trading variables,  
2 2 2 '
10 0
( )s ii jA Bσ σ∞ ∞= == +∑ ∑ j jBΩ , (8) 
which could be used as the proxy of noise in prices. I convert the trade-based variances, 
σwx2, σwo2 and σs2 respectively, into daily-based variables by multiplying them by the 
average daily number of trades and then taking the square roots, which makes the 










PRIVATE INFO NTRADES DAILY









PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO, and NOISE are used as the proxies of private 
information, public information and noise in stock prices. The model-based proxies 
estimated via the above unified framework have some merits over the exogenous proxies 
supposed to capture the amount of private information, public information and noise in 
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stock prices. First, the objective of this study is to compare the relative importance of 
these proxies in explaining the cross-sectional variation of idiosyncratic volatility. The 
measurement error embedded in the proxies would affect their explanatory power. Hence, 
if the proxies are not measured on a consistent basis and contain different degrees of 
measurement error, then the comparison of relative importance of underlying forces, 
information versus noise, in explaining idiosyncratic volatility is not convincing. 
Deriving the proxies of information and noise from the same return decomposition 
framework would make sure that they are measured on a consistent basis which is 
normally not the case for exogenous proxies from various sources. Second, if the 
variance decomposition model is appropriate, the proxies of private information, public 
information and noise estimated from the variance decomposition of prices capture the 
amount of information and noise actually reflected in the prices. Such a merit is 
important for the objective in this study to investigate whether the cross-sectional 
difference in idiosyncratic volatility is due to information or noise incorporated in prices. 
Other ex-ante measures may not capture the amount of information and noise actually 
incorporated in prices, though they are supposed to correlate with information and noise. 
However, the validity of model-based proxies relies critically on the reasonableness of 
the model assumptions. To check the validity of the model-based information proxies, I 
test the relation between these information proxies and an ex-ante measure of information 
flow, the frequency of firm-specific news releases appearing on major news media. The 
test and its result will be presented in section 4.  
 In the empirical implementation of the above variance decomposition procedure, I 
include three trading-related variables in the vector xt: a dummy variable indicating the 
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sign of trades, the trade size in terms of number of shares traded and the square root of 
trade size which captures the decreasing marginal price impact per share traded. I classify 
all valid trades as either buyer-initiated trades or seller-initiated trades according to the 
algorithm proposed by Lee and Ready (1991). The Lee-Ready algorithm deems a trade 
above (below) the quote midpoint as a buy (sell). A trade at the midpoint of the quoted 
spreads is classified using a ‘tick’ test. Specifically, a trade is classified as buy (sell) if it 
is transacted at a higher (lower) price than the previous trade. Trade and quote data are 
obtained from the NYSE TAQ database. I include all trades except for corrected trades, 
trades settled with conditions, open trades, and trades that occurred outside of regular 
trading hour (9:30 am – 4 pm EST). The quote revision pertaining to a trade is calculated 
as the difference between the log of the midpoint of the first revised quotes within 5 
seconds after the trade and the log of the midpoint of the quotes prevailing when the trade 
occurs. After obtaining quote revisions and trading variables, a VAR model of quote 
revisions rt and the vector of three trading-related variables xt, as in Eq. (4), is estimated 
with five lags of variables included. Then the VMA representation of Eq. (5) is obtained 
by converting the estimated VAR model with the truncation of moving autoregressive 
coefficients at 30th lag. The choice of five lags in VAR model and thirty lags in VMA 
representation follows Hasbrouck (1991) for convenience and the results are robust to 
alternative specifications of lags. Finally, the proxies of private information, public 
information and noise are derived from Beveridge-Nelson decomposition as illustrated 
above. Each year I apply the above procedure for each stock using its quotes and 
transaction data in that year to obtain its yearly measure of PRIVATE_INFO, 
PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE. 
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 2.3 Relation between idiosyncratic volatility and private information, public information 
and noise: regression analysis 
To study how idiosyncratic volatility is related to private information, public 
information and noise in the cross section, I run a regression of idiosyncratic volatility 
against the proxies for private information, public information and noise, as specified in 
Eq. (10), controlling other firm characteristics supposed to affect idiosyncratic volatility 
in the cross section, 
0 1 2 3
,1
* _ * _ *it it it it
J
j j it itj
IV a b PRIVATE INFO b PUBLIC INFO b NOISE
c CONTROL ε=
= + + +
+ +∑ . (10) 
Idiosyncratic volatility, IVit, is measured as the standard deviation of residuals from the 
market model of stock returns for firm i during year t as discussed in section 2.1.  
PRIVATE_INFOit, PUBLIC_INFOit and NOISEit are the proxies of the amount of private 
information, public information and noise incorporated in prices respectively. They are 
measured as the volatility of trading-related efficient price change, the volatility of 
trading-unrelated efficient price change and the volatility of transitory component in 
prices estimated from the variance decomposition of quoted prices for firm i during year t 
as discussed in section 2.2.  
The control variables in the regression include: 1) IV_ROEit, idiosyncratic 
volatility of firm i’s ROE, 2) SP500it, a dummy variable taking value 1 if firm i is a 
component of SP500 index, 3) MKTCAPit, the firm size of firm i, 4) NANALYSTit, the 
number of analysts following firm i, 5) INSTITUTIONit, the level of institutional 
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ownership of firm i, 6) INSDTRDit, the level of insider trading in firm i, 7) YEARit, year 
dummy variables, and 8) INDit, industry dummies.  
IV_ROEit is measured as the standard deviation of residuals from the regression 
of firm i’s quarterly return on equity (ROE) against the value-weighted average of 
quarterly ROEs for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ using 
data of all quarters ending between year t-5 to year t-1 from COMPUSTAT.9 Similar as 
the treatment in the calculation of IV, firm i’s ROE is excluded from the calculation of 
value-weighted market ROE in the estimation of its IV_ROE to avoid the potential 
spurious influence of firm size. The correlation of a firm’ fundamentals with those of 
other firms in the market will affect the level of idiosyncratic volatility of its returns if 
stock prices reflect its fundamental performance to some extent. Thus IV_ROE, which 
captures the idiosyncratic nature of individual firms’ fundamental performance, is 
expected to be positively related to IV.  
Indexing activity is another important factor affecting the co-movement among 
individual stocks’ returns (Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005). The dummy variable 
SP500 is included to control indexing effect. Index components are expected to have 
lower idiosyncratic volatility of return. Although a firm’s returns are excluded from the 
calculation of market returns to estimate its idiosyncratic volatility, large firms’ returns 
may still have higher correlation with market returns since these firms tend to be more 
diversified and also may be affected by market information more significantly. 
MKTCAPit, which is measured as the market capitalization at the end of year t-1, is 
included to control the effect of firm size.  
                                                 
9 I require a minimum of 12 quarterly ROEs to run the regression.  
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Further, previous literature finds that the activities of various market participants, 
such as analysts, institutional investors and insiders, are associated with the degree of 
return synchronicity (Chan and Hameed, 2006; and Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004). Since 
return synchronicity is normally measured as R2 from the regression of stock returns 
against systematic factors, by construction higher R2 means lower (relative) idiosyncratic 
volatility. Thus the proxies of the activity by these agents, NANALYSTit, 
INSTITUTIONit and INSDTRDit, are included in the regression. NANALYSTit is 
measured as the number of analysts making forecasts for firm i during year t-1, 
INSTITUTIONit is measured as the percentage of firm i’s shares outstanding held by the 
institutional investors at the end of year t-1, and INSDTRDit is measured as the 
percentage of firm i’s shares outstanding traded by the insiders during the year t. Year 
dummies and industry dummies are included in the regression to control the potential 
time trend in variables and industry-specific effect. Firms are classified into 17 industries 
based on four-digit SIC code according to Fama-French 17 industries classification 
scheme.10
In addition to link private information, public information and noise to 
idiosyncratic volatility in the cross section, I am also interested in comparing their 
relative influences on idiosyncratic volatility. In order to compare the regression 
coefficients on the proxies of private information, public information and noise, I 
logarithm transform all variables, except for dummy variables, so that the regression 
coefficients could be interpreted as elasticity coefficients.  
 
                                                 
10 The classification rules are available on Professor Kenneth French’s website, 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_17_ind_port.html.  
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2.4 Relation between idiosyncratic volatility and private information, public information 
and noise: dominance analysis 
The main objective of the empirical analysis in this paper is to evaluate the 
relative importance of private information, public information and noise in explaining the 
variation of idiosyncratic volatility in the cross section. Besides the standardized 
regression coefficients, another natural indicator of the contribution of a predictor in 
explaining the response is the incremental explanatory power, i.e., the increase in R2, 
pertaining to the predictor. However, since the predictors, i.e., PRIVATE_INFO, 
PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE here, are normally correlated, there is no ready measure of 
incremental explanatory power. I follow the following feasible procedure to develop a 
summary measure of the explanatory power contributed by a specific predictor to the 
response.  
Take the evaluation of the explanatory power of a specific predictor Pj among N 
predictors, P1, P2, …, PN, for the response variable R for example. First, I calculate the 
increase in R2 by adding Pj into the regression which has R as the dependent variable and 
other K predictors (K = 0, 1, 2… N-1) drawn from the pool of all predictors excluding Pj. 
I repeat this calculation for all possible combinations of K predictors chosen from the 
pool of all predictors excluding Pj. Second, I take the average of incremental R2 from the 
permutations in the first step to measure the explanatory power of Pj when the model size 
is K, i.e., there are K control predictors in addition to Pj included in the regression. 
Finally, to obtain a summary measure of explanatory power for Pj, I average the mean 
incremental R2 at all model sizes, ranging from 0 to N-1 if there are N predictors for 
comparison. This process is termed as dominance analysis in the literature and is widely 
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used to compare the relative importance of different predictors in explaining the response 
in various social science fields (see, e.g., Budescu, 1993; Azen and Budescu, 2003, 
among others). Harford and Kaul (2005) apply a similar procedure to study the sources of 
commonality of order flow.11  
                                                 
11 Another common indicator of model sufficiency is Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). The lower the 
AIC, the better the model fits. As a robustness check, I compare the reduction in AIC associated with the 
addition of each of the three variables, PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE, into regressions 
with various number of explanatory variables included. The marginal reduction in AIC gives the same 
conclusion about the relative explanatory powers of PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE for 
idiosyncratic volatility as the incremental R2 does. Private information proxy causes the most significant 
drop in AIC when it is added to the regressions, followed by public information proxy and noise proxy.  
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3. Sample and data 
3.1 Sample description 
The sample comprises of common stocks traded on the NYSE from 1993 to 2005. 
Only NYSE stocks are included in the analyses so as to abstract away from differences in 
trading protocols. Stocks other than common stocks, i.e., those with share code other than 
10 and 11, are excluded, since their trading characteristics might differ from those of 
ordinary equities.12 The restriction of sample period from 1993 to 2005 is due to the 
availability of trades and quotes data which are from NYSE TAQ database. Stock returns 
are retrieved from CRSP database. Accounting numbers are obtained from 
COMPUSTAT North America database. Institutional holding and insider trading data are 
obtained from Thompson Financial. And analysts’ forecasts data are from I/B/E/S. In 
addition to the requirement of NYSE common stock at the end of previous year, the 
following filtering criteria are applied for a firm-year to be included in the sample:  
 1) There are at least 60 days with trading during the year;  
 2) There are at least 500 valid trades during the year to obtain the proxies of 
 private information, public information and noise via the variance decomposition 
 as in Hasbrouck (1991);  
 3) There are at least 12 valid quarterly ROE data from all fiscal quarters ending in 
 the previous five calendar years to estimate idiosyncratic volatility of ROE;  
 4) The average daily close price during the year should be no less than $5.  
The above filters drop 2,592 firm-year observations and 195 unique firms out of the pool 
of NYSE common stocks. The final sample has 18,464 firm-year observations and 2680 
                                                 
12 The stocks that are dropped are in the following categories: certificates, American Depositary Receipts, 
shares of beneficial interest, units, companies incorporated outside the U.S., Americus Trust components, 
closed-end funds, preferred stocks, and Real Estate Investment Trusts. 
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unique firms. The yearly distribution of sample observations is presented in Table 1. The 
sample size is quite stable during the whole sample period.  
 
3.2 Summary statistics 
 The summary statistics are presented in Table 2. The average idiosyncratic 
volatility is 2.096% and varies significantly across stocks, ranging from 1.411% at 25 
percentile to 2.549% at 75 percentile. Un-tabulated result shows that for an average stock 
in the sample, the R-square of the Dimson adjusted market model of daily returns is 
0.155, which is consistent with the finding of poor fit of market model of stock returns in 
Roll (1988). The mean (median) value of PRIVATE_INFO is 1.071% (0.987%) per day, 
which is comparable with the corresponding number, 1.05%, in Hasbrouck (1991). The 
mean and median values of PUBLIC_INFO are 2.233% and 1.642% per day respectively. 
The mean daily metric of NOISE is 1.522%.13 The average idiosyncratic volatility of 
quarterly ROE is 6.448%. The average R-square (un-tabulated) from fitting market model 
to individual firms’ ROE is only 7.620%, indicating an average correlation coefficient 
between individual firms’ ROE and the value-weighted market ROE of about 0.3. About 
28.6% of firms in the sample are S&P 500 index components. The average market 
capitalization is 5.198 billion dollars for firms in the sample, but the distribution of firm 
size is highly skewed with the median value only at 1.034 billion dollars. The firms in the 
sample have quite high analyst coverage. The average number of analysts following is 
                                                 
13 According to Hasbrouck (1991), the average PRIVATE_INFO for a sample of NYSE stocks is 0.412% 
per hour which translates into about 1.05% per day. And the corresponding hourly number for 
PUBLIC_INFO is 0.592% which is equivalent to about 1.51% per day. The magnitude of pricing error per 
trade calculated in this paper is about 6 basis points, a value much lower than the number reported in 
Hasbrouck (1993). The discrepancy should be due to the decrease of the magnitude of pricing error over 
time and also the use of transaction prices in Hasbrouck (1993) which compound bid-ask spreads into 
pricing error. 
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about 12. And institutional investors hold quite a significant portion of shares of firms in 
the sample. About 55% of shares outstanding are held by institutional investors for an 
average firm in the sample. Finally, on average, 1.645% of shares outstanding are traded 
by the insiders every year.  
Correlation matrix is presented Table 3. The Pearson correlation coefficients are 
reported in the upper-right bloc of the table while the Spearman rank correlation 
coefficients (in Italic) are presented in the lower-left bloc. First, greater IV is associated 
with higher PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE as well. The strong 
correlation between IV and model-based proxies of information and noise suggests that 
both firm-specific information and noise could play important roles in influencing 
idiosyncratic volatility. Second, not surprisingly, firms with more idiosyncratic volatility 
of ROE also have greater IV which is consistent with that idiosyncratic volatility of 
return could be due to the idiosyncratic fundamental performance. Third, consistent with 
the indexing trading hypothesis, index components tend to have lower idiosyncratic 
volatility of returns which is evidenced in the significantly negative correlation between 
IV and SP500. Further, firms with greater IV are also characterized by smaller size, less 
number of analysts following, and more trading by insiders. Finally, it is interesting to 
observe that there exists high correlation among PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and 
NOISE. It suggests that public information, private information and noise are 
complementing rather than substituting for one another in the price formation. It also 
implies a difficult task to disentangle their roles in affecting idiosyncratic volatility. The 
Spearman rank correlation coefficients are qualitatively similar as the Pearson ones, 
indicating that the skewness of variable distribution won’t significantly distort the 
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correlation among variables and the linear relationship would be a reasonable 
approximation.  
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4. Validation of model-based information proxies 
 PRIVATE_INFO and PUBLIC_INFO, derived from the Beveridge-Nelson 
decomposition of quoted prices, are assumed to capture the amount of private 
information and public information incorporated in prices. Whether these proxies work 
depends on the reasonableness of the model assumptions and the appropriateness of 
empirical implementation. In this section, I use an ex-ante measure of information flow, 
the frequency of firm-specific news releases appearing on www.MarketWatch.com which 
receives news from major news media, to check whether these model-based information 
flow measures are good proxies. Due to the availability of news data, I check the relation 
between the model-based information proxies and the frequency of news using year 2004 
data.   
MarketWatch is a financial information services provider wholly owned by Dow 
Jones & Company, Inc. It provides a broad coverage of relevant firm-specific news, 
including press releases via Business Wire, PR Newswire, Market Wire, and Prime Zone, 
SEC filings by Edgar Online, and other news from more than 20 high-profile media 
sources such as Reuters, The Wall Street Journal Online, New York Times, CBS News, 
FT.com, among others. I measure the frequency of news for each firm as the number of 
days with news (NEWSDAYS) appearing on www.MarketWatch.com during 2004. An 
alternative measure of the frequency of news could be the number of news items 
(YEARNEWS) appearing on www.MarketWatch.com during 2004. 
Compared with the number of news items, the number of news days has the 
following advantages as the measure of news frequency. First, the use of number of news 
days gets around the problem of double counting the same news story reported by 
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different news sources which appears as multiple news items on the website. Thus, higher 
number of news items during a specific day may not necessarily imply greater flow of 
information. Second, the distribution of the number of news items is highly skewed and is 
dominated by a few firms which have a large number of news items almost every day. In 
2004, the median (mean) number of news items per firm is 99 (180) for all firms in our 
sample, while the median (mean) value of the number of days with news is 55 (71). The 
skewness of the distribution of the number of news items is much higher than that of the 
number of news days. The use of number of news days rather than number of news items 
mitigates any potential bias introduced by the above data distortion.14  However, this 
benefit is offset by a loss of information from assigning the same value of 1 to many or 
one news item during a specific day. The discussion is mainly based on the results using 
the number of days with news as the proxy of news frequency. However, measuring the 
frequency of news as the number of news items gives quantitatively similar results which 
are also reported.  
It seems intuitive to use news frequency as the proxy of the amount of public 
information flow only since these news releases are supposed to be available to public. 
But it is important to differentiate between the news releases and public information as 
reflected in prices. The information contained in the news releases is not necessarily 
public though news releases are assumed to be accessible for the public. In this study I 
use the frequency of news to proxy for the amount of both public information and private 
                                                 
14 Sometimes a news story may describe the previous days’ trading and price movement in a stock. Such 
news release does not contain any new information and adds noise to the news variable. I check to what 
extent this problem exists in the data by aggregating all the news items into categories according to specific 
key words appearing in the headlines of the news release. For example, to delineate news releases that 
relate to prices and trades of a particular stock and the market, I search for the key words, such as “market”, 
“trading”, “prices” and “volume”, in the headline of the news release. I find that the proportion of news 
releases with the above key words in their headlines to the total news releases is less than 0.5%. I delete 
these observations from our sample of news releases. 
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information based on the following logics. First, investors may have heterogeneous 
interpretations of the news released and generate their own private information (Kim and 
Verrecchia, 1997). Thus the amount of private information would increase with the 
frequency of news releases. Second, even if investors agree on the information content of 
the news released, part of the information might have already been incorporated into 
prices via the trading by informed investors before the news releases. And most value-
relevant private information would be revealed to the public in due time. In sum, the 
frequency of news measured over a period, such as one year here, could be used to proxy 
for the amount of both public and private information arrived at the market during this 
period.  
 I check the relation between the model-based information proxies and the 
frequency of news using a sample of 1269 common stocks traded on NYSE and having 
news data available on www.MarketWatch.com during year 2004. Firms are first sorted 
into three equally-sized groups based on the market capitalization at the end of year 2003 
and then classified into three equally-sized sub-groups based on the frequency of news in 
year 2004 within each size group. Then I compare the mean and median values of 
PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO, NOISE, and the information ratio measures, 
RATIO_PRIVATE and RATIO_INFO which are defined in Eq. (11), across groups of 
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RATIO_PRIVATE and RATIO_INFO measures the relative importance of private 
information and total information reflected in price innovations.  
 Table 4 presents the results of comparing the model-based information proxies 
across groups of firms with different number of days with news. Panel A reports the 
mean value of each group and T-value from T-test of the equality of variables between 
high news firms and low news firms, while panel B reports the median value of each 
group and Z-value from Wilcoxon rank-sum test of the equality of variables between 
high news firms and low news firms. It is clear from the table that PRIVATE_INFO, 
PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE all increase with NEWSDAYS and the pattern is especially 
strong for PRIVATE_INFO. The mean (median) value of PRIVATE_INFO increases 
from 0.899 (0.816) percent per day for low news firms to 1.062 (1.003) percent per day 
for high news firms. Both the T-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test indicate a significant 
difference in PRIVATE_INFO between low news firms and high news firms. 
PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE increase less significantly with NEWSDAYS, and 
consequently the relative importance of PRIVATE_INFO, measured as 
RATIO_PRIVATE, is higher among high news firms. The ratio of total information 
relative to total variance also increases with NEWSDAYS, which is mainly due to the 
positive relation between PRIVATE_INFO and NEWSDAYS. The comparison of the 
model-based information proxies across groups of firms with different number of news 
items gives similar result which is reported in Table 5.  
The comparison results indicate that firms with more ex-ante information flow, 
measured as either the number of days with news or the number of news items, have 
higher amount of private information and public information incorporated in prices. The 
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amount of noise also increases, but much less significantly compared with private 
information proxy, with the frequency of news. And as such, the relative importance of 
information versus noise, measured in either RATIO_PRIVATE or RATIO_INFO, is 
also higher among firms with more frequent news.  
 To further check the validity of the model-based information proxies, I run a 
horse race test of the explanatory power of the model-based proxies of private 
information, public information and noise for the frequency of news. Specifically, the 
frequency of news is regressed against PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE, as 
specified in Eq. (12) below, 
1 2
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I include the firm size, measured as the market capitalization at the end of year 2003, and 
the industry dummies based on Fama-French 17 industries classification in the above 
regression. Except for the industry dummy variables, all other variables are logarithm 
transformed.  
The regression results are reported in Table 6. The regression coefficients and the 
associated T-statistics (below in Italic) based on industry-clustered standard errors are 
reported. The coefficients on industry dummies are suppressed for convenience. The 
regressions using NEWSDAYS and YEARNEWS as the dependent variable produce 
similar results. Consistent with the above sorting results, there exists a strong relation 
between news frequency and model-based proxy of private information, 
PRIVATE_INFO. The model-based noise proxy is also statistically significantly related 
with the frequency of news, but the relation is much weaker compared with the relation 
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between PRIVATE_INFO and news frequency. However, the coefficient on the model-
based measure of public information, PUBLIC_INFO, is insignificant, which might be 
due to the supplemental relationship between private information and public information. 
Some studies suggest that public information and private information are supplements 
rather than substitutes to each other (Kim and Verrecchia, 1997; Livne, 2000). In sum, 
both the sorting and regression results indicate a significantly positive relation between 
the model-based information flow proxies and the ex-ante information flow proxy such as 
the frequency of news releases, and verify that these model-based measures serve as 
reasonably good proxies.15   
                                                 
15 The differentiation between private information proxy and public information proxy is based on the 
standard market microstructure argument that private information has to be incorporated into stock price 
via informed trading. We would expect that the greater amount of private information relative to public 
information is associated with the higher adverse selection cost.  I try to relate the ratio of private 
information proxy to public information proxy, termed as RATIO_PRIVATE for convenience, with two 
illiquidity measures, the bid-ask spread and the price impact of trades estimated from the procedure in 
Glosten and Harris (1988). I find that RATIO_PRIVATE is significantly positively associated with both 
illiquidity measures after controlling firm size, year and industry fixed effects. The results suggest that the 
higher the proxy of private information relative to the proxy of public information, the more illiquid the 
stock is, which is consistent with the volatility of trading-related efficient price change capturing the 
amount of private information in stock prices. The results are un-tabulated but available upon request. 
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5. Relation between idiosyncratic volatility and private information, public information 
and noise 
 In this section, I report the results of the empirical analyses relating private 
information, public information and noise with idiosyncratic volatility and comparing the 
relative explanatory powers of these three variables in explaining the cross-sectional 
variation of idiosyncratic volatility. Section 5.1 presents the result of comparing the 
values of the proxies of private information, public information and noise across groups 
of firms formed on idiosyncratic volatility. Section 5.2 presents the results of regression 
analysis and dominance analysis for the pool sample. Section 5.3 presents the result of 
sub-sample analyses by sample periods. Section 5.4 presents the result of sub-sample 
analyses by firm size. In all the above analyses, idiosyncratic volatility is measured as the 
standard deviation of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ daily returns against 
two lags of, contemporaneous, and two leads of value-weighted return for all common 
stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ within each sample year, as specified in 
Eq. (1) in section 2.1. Section 5.5 presents the results of regression analysis and 
dominance analysis using idiosyncratic volatility measured from the Dimson-adjusted 
market model of weekly returns and monthly returns. Section 5.6 presents the results of 
robustness analyses using alternative measures of idiosyncratic volatility estimated from 
industry-augmented market model and Fama-French three factor model.  
 
5.1 Univariate analysis 
 In this section, I compare the values of PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO, and 
NOISE, which are estimated from the variance decomposition of quoted prices following 
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Hasbrouck (1991) as illustrated in section 2.2, across firms with different amount of 
idiosyncratic volatility. Each year firms are first sorted into three equally-sized groups 
based on the market capitalization at the end of previous year and then classified into 
three equally-sized sub-groups based on IV within each size group. Then I compare the 
mean and median values of PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO, NOISE, and the 
information ratio measures, RATIO_PRIVATE and RATIO_INFO which are defined in 
Eq. (11) in section 4, across groups of firms with different levels of IV.  
 Table 7 presents the comparison result. Panel A reports the mean value of each 
group and T-value from T-test of the equality of variables between high IV firms and low 
IV firms, while panel B reports the median value of each group and Z-value from 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test of the equality of variables between high IV firms and low IV 
firms. It is clear from the table that PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE all 
increase with IV and the pattern is especially strong for PRIVATE_INFO. The mean 
value of PRIVATE_INFO almost doubles to 1.43 percent per day for high IV firms from 
0.763 percent per day for low IV firms, which is the case also for the median value of 
PRIVATE_INFO. Both T-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum test indicate a significant 
difference in PRIVATE_INFO between high IV firms and low IV firms. PUBLIC_INFO 
and NOISE also increase significantly with IV, though to a less extent than 
PRIVATE_INFO does. Consequently, the relative importance of PRIVATE_INFO, 
measured as RATIO_PRIVATE, is higher among high IV firms, and the difference 
between high IV firms and low IV ones is significant as indicated by the T-test and 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The T-test also suggests a significant difference in the mean 
value of RATIO_INFO between high IV firms and low IV firms.  
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The univariate comparison shows that firms with greater idiosyncratic volatility are 
characterized by higher amount of private information, public information and noise as 
well. There is evidence that information plays a more important role relative to noise in 
high IV firms. However, the sorting result also highlights the point that both information 
and noise may contribute to idiosyncratic volatility and it is important to differentiate 
their influences.  
 
5.2 Pool-sample multivariate analysis 
5.2.1 Regression analysis 
 In this section, I report the pool-sample result of regressing idiosyncratic volatility 
against the proxies of private information, public information and noise, as specified in 
Eq. (10) in section 2.3, controlling other firm characteristics supposed to affect 
idiosyncratic volatility in the cross section. The control variables include IV_ROE, 
SP500, MKTCAP, NANALYST, INSTITUTION, INSDTRD, year dummies and 
industry dummies all of which are defined in section 2.3.  
 The regression result is reported in Table 8. Model 1 includes only 
PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE, and model 2 also includes all control 
variables specified above as the explanatory variables. Regression coefficients and the 
associated T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm (below in Italic) are 
reported. The coefficients on year dummies and industry dummies are suppressed for 
convenience. The regression result of model 1 shows that PRIVATE_INFO, 
PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE explain quite a significant portion of the variation of IV. The 
adjusted R2 of model 1 is 0.721. All three variables are significantly positively related 
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with IV. The proxy of private information, PRIVATE_INFO, shows up as the most 
significant variable influencing the variation of IV, then followed by PUBLIC_INFO and 
NOISE. One percent increase in the variable would be associated with 0.737 percent, 
0.102 percent and 0.072 percent increase in IV for PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and 
NOISE respectively.  
 Adding control variables does not change the above results qualitatively. The 
adjusted R2 increases to 0.813 for model 2. PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and 
NOISE are all significantly positively related with IV. PRIVATE_INFO remains as the 
most significant variable in explaining IV and strongly dominates PUBLIC_INFO and 
NOISE.  
Most of the control variables have the expected signs and are significantly related 
with IV. First, the coefficient on IV_ROE is significantly positive, which is consistent 
with the idea that firms with more idiosyncratic fundamental performance will have 
greater amount of idiosyncratic volatility of returns. Second, the significantly negative 
coefficient on SP500 index dummy indicates that indexing activity does affect return 
comovement and idiosyncratic volatility. The index constituent stocks tend to have lower 
idiosyncratic volatility, which is consistent with the findings by Barberis et al (2005) and 
Harford and Kaul (2005) that indexing activity is an important source of commonality in 
returns and order flows. Third, large firms tend to have lower idiosyncratic volatility as 
evidenced in the significantly negative coefficient on MKTCAP. Several possible 
explanations may explain this relation. Large firms are more likely to be diversified in 
their business and thus have lower idiosyncratic cash flow component. Further, investors 
may have less incentive to invest in private information acquisition in large firms due to 
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either less information asymmetry or relative less importance of firm-specific information 
in affecting stock prices.  
Finally, previous studies find that the trading by insiders and institutional 
investors in a firm decreases while the activities of analyst in a firm increases the degree 
of co-movement of its returns with market returns (Chan and Hameed, 2006; Piotroski 
and Roulstone, 2004). Ceteris paribus, firms with higher price synchronicity tend to have 
lower idiosyncratic volatility of returns. Thus we would expect that IV is positively 
related with the trading by insiders and institutional holding while negatively related with 
analyst coverage.16 The result presented here supports the hypothesized positive relation 
of IV with insider trading and institutional holding. The coefficients on both 
INSTITUTION and INSDTRD are significantly positive, which is consistent with the 
trading by institutional investors and insiders conveying firm-specific information and 
facilitating the incorporation of firm-specific information into prices. However, the 
significantly positive coefficient on NANALYST contradicts the finding of positive 
relation between the analyst coverage and return synchronicity documented in the 
previous literature. A possible explanation is the inclusion of information flow proxies in 
the regression. Chan and Hameed (2006) and Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) suggest that 
analysts mainly produce market or industry wide information but relatively less firm 
specific information, which explains the positive relation between analyst coverage and 
return synchronicity. Thus the proxies of information flows, PRIVATE_INFO and 
PUBLIC_INFO, could subsume the explanatory power of analyst coverage for IV. Un-
tabulated results show NANALYST is negatively related with IV if the information flow 
                                                 
16 We have only quarterly holdings by institutional investors but not interim trading data by institutional 
investors for each firm. It is reasonable to assume that firms with more institutional holding tend to have 
more active trading by institutional investors. 
 39
proxies are not included in the regression, which is consistent with the findings in 
previous studies. The coefficients on year dummies and industry dummies are suppressed 
for convenience. There exists significant variation in IV across years and industries. IV is 
higher during the tech-boom period from 1998 to 2001. And industries such as food, 
chemicals, steel works, utilities and financials have relatively lower IV. 
5.2.2 Dominance analysis 
 In this section, I report the result of pool-sample dominance analysis which 
compares the explanatory powers of PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE in 
explaining the cross-sectional variation of IV as specified in section 2.4. I conduct the 
dominance analysis in two ways. Firstly I compare the relative explanatory powers of 
PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE for IV without controlling any other 
variables. And then I take into account of other control variables, such as IV_ROE, 
SP500, MKTCAP, NANALYST, INSTITUTION, INSDTRD, year dummies and 
industry dummies, by first regressing IV against the control variables and then comparing 
the relative explanatory powers of PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE for the 
residual IV from the first-stage regression.  
The outputs of dominance analyses are presented in Table 9, with panel A 
reporting the results using the original IV as the dependent variable and panel B reporting 
the results using the residual IV after expurgating the influences of other control variables 
as the dependent variable. Model size refers to the number of variables included in the 
regression other than the variable under consideration. For example, for PRIVATE_INFO, 
the regression models with size 1 include either PUBLIC_INFO or NOISE as the 
additional regressor. Though the magnitude of the incremental R2 differs significantly 
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across the two sets of results, the inference about the relative explanatory powers of 
PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE for IV does not differ whether the original 
IV or the residual IV is used for analysis. Thus I take the result using the original IV as 
the dependent variable for analysis. First, PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE 
all explain a significant portion of the variation of IV when each of them is put as the sole 
regressor in the regression. R2 added by each of them without including others is 0.691 
for PRIVATE_INFO, 0.36 for PUBLIC_INFO and 0.352 for NOISE respectively. 
However, the marginal R2 contributed by each of them on top of the other two variables 
is 0.29 for PRIVATE_INFO, 0.01 for PUBLIC_INFO and 0.006 for NOISE respectively. 
The average incremental R2 contributed by each variable across all model sizes is 0.446 
for PRIVATE_INFO, 0.141 for PUBLIC_INFO and 0.135 for NOISE respectively. The 
average incremental R2 captures the explanatory power of the variables under different 
model specifications and could serve as the basis to compare the relative importance of 
these three variables in explaining the variation of IV. Loosely speaking, on average 
PRIVATE_INFO contributes about 62% of the total explanatory power contributed by 
these three variables for IV, and significantly dominates the other two variables 
PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE in terms of explaining the variation of IV. The analysis using 
the residual IV as the dependent variable yields the similar conclusion.  
 To summarize, the results of both the regression analysis and dominance analysis 
using the pool sample show that PRIVATE_INFO is the most influential factor driving 
the variation of idiosyncratic volatility among the three, followed by PUBLIC_INFO and 
NOISE. It suggests that the cross-sectional variation in idiosyncratic volatility is mostly 
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due to different amount of private information incorporated in prices. In the next few 
sections, I will conduct various robustness analyses to verify the above results.  
 
5.3 Sub-sample multivariate analysis by sample period 
Over the sample period in this study, NYSE experienced two changes in tick size, 
one from 8th to 16th in June, 1997 and the other one to decimals in January, 2001. The 
change of tick size would affect the execution cost and thus may affect the trading 
behavior of informed investor and noise investor, which could result in some patterns in 
the explanatory powers of private information, public information and noise for 
idiosyncratic volatility under different regimes of tick size. I partition the sample period 
into three sub-periods according to the time of tick size changes: the first period (1993 – 
1997) corresponding to the tick size of 8th, the second period (1998 - 2001) for the tick 
size of 16th, and the third period (2002 – 2005) for the decimal tick size, and conduct the 
empirical analyses for each sub-period.17 The results of regression analysis and 
dominance analysis are reported in Table 10 and 11 respectively.  
The following findings are documented. First, in all three sub-periods, 
PRIVATE_INFO is significantly positively related with IV and strongly dominates 
PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE in explaining the variation of IV, which is consistent with 
the finding in the pool regression analysis. Furthermore, the explanatory power of private 
information for IV increases when the tick size is smaller. The coefficient on 
PRIVATE_INFO increases from 0.609 in period 1993 to 1997, to 0.795 in period 1998 to 
2001, and to 0.838 in period 2002 to 2005. The average incremental R2 associated with 
PRIVATE_INFO also increases significantly when the tick size is smaller. This is 
                                                 
17 The results are almost the same if the transition years, 1997 and 2001, are excluded. 
 42
consistent with the finding of increased adverse selection and probability of informed 
trading in previous literature (Chakravarty, Van Ness, and Van Ness, 2005; Zhao and 
Chung, 2006). The result indicates that the reduced transaction cost and improved order 
execution due to smaller tick size encourages informed trading and thus helps to 
incorporate private information into stock prices.  
Second, the explanatory power of public information decreases significantly with 
smaller tick size. Both the regression coefficient and the incremental R2 decrease 
significantly from the first period to the last two periods. The pattern is somewhat 
surprising and may deserve further exploration in the future study. Third, the pattern in 
the explanatory power of noise is mixed. When the tick size is reduced, noise is more 
significantly associated with idiosyncratic volatility as evidenced from more significant 
regression coefficient, but explains relatively smaller portion of the variation of 
idiosyncratic volatility as evidenced from smaller incremental R2. Conceptually, it is 
unclear whether the reduction in tick size would increase or decrease the amount of noise 
in stock prices. On the one hand, the smaller tick size and reduced quoted spreads 
decreases the magnitude of pricing error caused by market microstructure frictions. On 
the other hand, the reduced transaction cost may induce noise traders to trade more 
aggressively, which may increase the amount of noise in prices. It is an interesting 
research topic to pursue in the future.  
 
5.4 Sub-sample multivariate analysis by firm size 
 Firm size is significantly related with IV as evidenced in the results of pool-
sample regression analysis. Firm size is also related with other variables, especially 
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PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE, as can be seen from the correlation 
coefficients in Table 3. Though the proxy of firm size, MKTCAP, is included in the 
regression model, it is still possible that firm size may contaminate the relationship 
between IV and PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE. As a robustness check, I 
conduct the multivariate analyses for groups of firms formed on firm size separately. 
Specifically, each year firms in the sample are classified into three equally-sized groups 
based on the market capitalization at the end of previous year and then the regression 
analysis and dominance analysis are conducted for each size sub-sample. The sub-sample 
analysis by firm size also helps to reveal any possible cross-sectional variation in the 
relationship between IV and the proxies of information and noise across firms of different 
sizes.  
 Table 12 and 13 present the results of regression analysis and dominance analysis 
respectively. PRIVATE_INFO is significantly positively related with IV in all firm size 
groups, which is the case for PUBLIC_INFO also. The explanatory powers of both 
PRIVATE_INFO and PUBLIC_INFO are quite stable across size groups. Interestingly, 
the explanatory power of NOISE decreases significantly with firm size. NOISE is 
significantly positively related with IV only in the sample of small firms, which may 
suggest that idiosyncratic volatility contains more noise component for small firms 
compared with large firms. However, the result needs to be interpreted with caution. 
Market microstructure studies normally suggest that noise traders prefer to trade in large 
firms since these firms have less information asymmetry and lower transaction cost, 
which seems to be inconsistent with the finding of more noise component in prices of 
small firms here. Two possible explanations could reconcile the findings. First, though 
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noise traders may prefer to trade in large firms, their trading may affect the stock price in 
these firms to a less extent. Second, the noise in stock prices also comes from the market 
microstructure frictions like bid-ask spread and transitory price impact of trading. Large 
stocks tend to be more liquid and have lower transaction cost, and thus may contain less 
market microstructure noise. 
 For the control variables, there are also some quite interesting patterns in the 
coefficients associated with firm size. The coefficients on SP500 and INSTITUTION are 
more significant for the regression of large firms. Small firms are normally not S&P500 
index components and not held significantly by the institutional investors, and thus there 
is not much cross-sectional variation in SP500 and INSTITUTION in the sample of small 
and medium firms, which may explain the decreasing coefficients on these two variables 
with firm size. INSDTRD is significant in small and medium firms but not in the large 
firms, which indicates that insider trading plays a less important role in influencing IV for 
large firms, a group of firms normally with less active insider trading.  
  
5.5 Relation between idiosyncratic volatility and private information, public information 
and noise at different horizons 
 In all the above analyses, IV is measured as the standard deviation of residuals 
from Dimson-adjusted market model of daily stock returns. In this section, I replicate the 
analyses for IV estimated using weekly returns and monthly returns. The analyses using 
returns over various horizons serve two folds of objectives. The first objective is to check 
the robustness of the results of the analyses using IV estimated from daily returns. The 
second objective is to identify some possible patterns in the findings across different 
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horizons over which IV is estimated. The proxy of noise, NOISE, is shown to affect IV 
significantly in the above analyses, although to a much less extent than the proxy of 
private information, PRIVATE_INFO, does. However, noise is unrelated with 
fundamentals and transitory in nature. Hence, we would expect that the influence of noise 
on IV decreases with the time horizon over which stock return is measured.  
 For the analyses at weekly horizon, IV is measured as the standard deviation of 
residuals from regressing individual stocks’ weekly returns against one lag of, 
contemporaneous, and one lead of value-weighted weekly return for all common stocks 
traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ within each sample year. The proxies of 
information and noise, PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE respectively, and 
the set of control variables are defined in the same ways as those in the analyses at daily 
horizon. The analyses at weekly horizon use all firm-year observations.  
For the analyses at monthly horizon, to ensure an enough number of monthly 
returns to estimate idiosyncratic volatility, the total sample period is divided into three 
sub-periods: period 1 from 1993 to 1997, period 2 from 1998 to 2001 and period 3 from 
2002 to 2005. IV is measured as the standard deviation of residuals from regressing 
individual stocks’ monthly returns against one lag of, contemporaneous, and one lead of 
value-weighted monthly return for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ within each sample period. The set of control variables are the same as those 
in the regression at weekly horizon except that year dummies are replaced by sub-period 
dummies. All the explanatory variables, except for dummy variables, are calculated as 
the average values of the corresponding yearly variables within each sub-period. SP500 
takes value 1 if a firm is one of S&P 500 index components at the beginning of each sub-
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period and 0 otherwise. The value of industry dummies are assigned based on industry 
affiliation at the beginning of each sub-period. The analyses at monthly horizon use all 
firm-period observations.  
 The result of regression is reported in Table 14. Comparing the result here with 
that at daily horizon in Table 8 shows that the coefficient on the proxy of noise, NOISE, 
decreases with the time horizon over which IV is estimated. It is positive and significant 
at daily horizon, positive but insignificant at weekly horizon, and negative but 
insignificant at monthly horizon. But there is no such pattern for the coefficients on the 
proxies of private information and public information. Both the coefficients on 
PRIVATE_INFO and PUBLIC_INFO are positive and significant in all the regressions 
with IV estimated at daily, weekly and monthly horizons as the dependent variable. The 
regression coefficients on the control variables are qualitatively similar as those in the 
regression using daily IV reported in Table 8, except that the coefficients on 
INSTITUTION and INSDTRD are not significant in the regression using monthly IV.  
 Table 15 reports the result of dominance analysis using the residual IV from 
regressing IV against the set of control variables defined in the regression analysis above 
as the dependent variable. It confirms the basic finding in the dominance analysis at daily 
horizon that PRIVATE_INFO remains as the most significant contributor to the variation 
of IV no matter whether IV is estimated at weekly or monthly horizon. The result also 
indicates a general decrease in the explanatory power for PRIVATE_INFO, 
PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE in explaining IV when IV is estimated over longer horizon.  
  
5.6 Robustness check using alternative measures of idiosyncratic volatility 
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 In all the analyses so far I use the Dimson-adjusted market model in which the 
market return is measured as value-weighted average of individual stocks’ returns. In this 
section, I replicate the regression analysis for alternative IV measures estimated in 
different ways to check the robustness of the findings documented above.  
5.6.1 Estimating idiosyncratic volatility using market model and equally-weighted market 
return 
 Since value-weighted market return will be dominated by a few large firms, IV 
estimated from the market model using value-weighted market return may be biased 
downward for large firms, which may affect the results of analyses above. As a 
robustness check, I replicate the regression analysis for IV estimated from Dimson-
adjusted market model in which the market return is measured as the equally-weighted 
average of individual stocks’ returns. Similarly, IV_ROE is also estimated using market 
model with equally-weighted ROE for all firms. The results of the regressions using daily, 
weekly and monthly INOISE are reported in Table 16. The results are almost the same as 
those from the regressions using IV estimated from market model with value-weighted 
market return as the dependent variable. Especially, MKTCAP is still significantly 
negatively related with IV in all the three regressions. The results suggest that whether 
the market return is measured as the value-weighted or equally-weighted average of 
individual stocks’ returns is not critical for the results presented in this study.  
5.6.2 Estimating idiosyncratic volatility using industry-augmented market model 
 Conceptually idiosyncratic volatility refers to the firm-specific price movement 
which is unrelated with the systematic influences. In the analyses so far I include only the 
market return and its leads and lags to capture the systematic influences. In the previous 
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literature, some studies also expurgate the industry-wide influences from stock returns to 
estimate idiosyncratic volatility. Following Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), I include the 
lags of, contemporaneous, and the leads of industry returns in the market model to 
estimate IV, as specified in the following equation,  
, ,
L L
i t i il m t l il i t l i tl L l L
R R R , ,α β γ−=− =−= + + +∑ ∑ ε−
                                                
. (13) 
Rm,t is the value-weighted average of returns of all common stocks traded on NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ, and Ri,t is the value weighted average of returns of all common 
stocks within the same industry where industry affiliation is assigned based on Fama-
French 17 industries classification scheme. Two leads and two lags are used to estimate 
daily IV, while one lead and one lag are used for weekly and monthly IV. Similarly, I add 
the value-weighted average of ROEs for all firms in the same industry in the market 
model of ROE to estimate IV_ROE. The regression result using IV estimated from 
industry-augmented market model is reported in Table 17. Expurgating industry 
influences out of returns to define IV does not change the result significantly.  
5.6.3 Estimating idiosyncratic volatility using Fama-French three-factor model 
 Fama and French (1996) find that lots of variation in expected returns across 
firms could be explained by a three-factor model which includes the returns on the 
market portfolio and two mimicking portfolios of size and book-to-market ratio. 
Following Ang et al. (2006), I estimate idiosyncratic volatility as the standard deviation 
of the residuals from the regression of a firm’s stock return against the Fama-French three 
factors,18 as specified in the equation below,  
 
18 The daily, weekly and monthly returns of size and book-to-market mimicking portfolios are obtained 
from the website of Professor Kenneth French, 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.  
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, 1 , 2 3i t i i m t i t i t i tR R SML HML ,α β β β= + + + + ε . (14) 
The regression result is presented in Table 18. Again, estimating IV using Fama-French 
three-factor model does not change the result qualitatively either.  
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6. Discussion 
Corroboratively, the regression analysis and dominance analysis show that most 
of the variation in idiosyncratic volatility is due to the different amount of private 
information compounded in prices by informed trading. The findings in this paper are 
consistent with the argument in Morck et al (2000) that low idiosyncratic volatility in 
emerging markets is due to the lack of informed trading. The results are also consistent 
with the empirical evidence in Durnev et al (2003) that the firms with greater 
idiosyncratic volatility have more informative prices in the sense that more private 
information is incorporated into prices by active informed trading.  
The public information proxy is significantly related with IV at various time 
horizons over which IV is estimated. However, it only explains a very limited portion of 
the variation of idiosyncratic volatility. The weak explanatory power of public 
information proxy is actually consistent with the finding in Roll (1988) who finds that the 
R2 of market model of returns increases trivially after excluding the days with firm news. 
The relative week explanatory power of public information after controlling private 
information and noise could be due to its high correlation with private information. 
Public news release may attract both informed and uninformed trading 
(Sankaraguruswamy, Shen and Takeshi, 2007), and thus public information is 
accompanied by the private information and noise. Hence the effect of public information 
on idiosyncratic volatility may be partly subsumed by private information.  
The result also indicates that noise is a significant factor influencing the variation 
of idiosyncratic volatility at daily horizon. It highlights the concern that idiosyncratic 
volatility represents not only firm-specific information but also noise. However, 
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compared with private information proxy, the noise measure contributes very limited 
explanatory power to idiosyncratic volatility. It is possible that the noise measure in this 
study could be insufficient and under-estimate its explanatory power. However, given the 
significant explanatory power contributed by the measure of private information for 
idiosyncratic volatility, it seems unlikely that noise would dominate information in 
explaining idiosyncratic volatility. Especially, the explanatory power of noise for 
idiosyncratic volatility diminishes quickly when idiosyncratic volatility is measured over 
longer time horizons such as weekly or monthly horizons.  
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7. Conclusion 
Roll (1988) finds that most of return variation is due to idiosyncratic influences, 
either firm-specific information or pricing noise. Previous studies such as Morck et al 
(2000) and Durnev et al (2003) suggest that idiosyncratic volatility is more likely due to 
the incorporation of firm-specific information into prices. However, some recent studies 
suggest that idiosyncratic volatility may represent noise rather than information. I 
empirically address the debate by examining the contribution of the proxies of private 
information, public information and noise to the variation of idiosyncratic volatility 
across firms.  
I develop proxies for private information, public information and noise by 
applying the variance decomposition procedure as in Hasbrouck (1991) to quoted prices. 
The empirical analyses suggest that the amount of private information incorporated in the 
prices is one of the most significant factors driving the variation of idiosyncratic volatility 
and strongly dominates public information and noise in explaining idiosyncratic volatility. 
This evidence supports the argument that greater idiosyncratic volatility implies more 
information incorporated in prices rather than noise. However, the noise proxy is also 
found to affect idiosyncratic volatility at high frequency. The explanatory power of noise 
decreases with the length of time horizon over which the return is measured.  
Overall, the results indicate that variation of idiosyncratic volatility is mainly due 
to the difference in private information incorporated in prices by informed trading. The 
empirical evidence also has implication for the debate about whether the prices of firms 
with greater idiosyncratic volatility are more informative. Empirical results in this paper 
show that greater idiosyncratic volatility is more likely due to more firm-specific private 
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information on top of systematic information incorporated into prices. In this sense, 
prices of firms with greater idiosyncratic volatility contain more value-relevant 
information and thus might be more informative. 
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Table 1 The descriptions of sample size 
This table describes the size of sample used in the paper for all years in the sample period. 
The second column presents the number of common stocks traded on NYSE each year and the 
last column reports the number of stocks included in the sample each year. The total number of 
firm-year observations and the number of unique firms are also reported in the last two rows 
respectively.   
 
Number of observations 
Year 
NYSE common stock Sample 
1993 1466 1327 
1994 1561 1422 
1995 1629 1462 
1996 1685 1511 
1997 1796 1575 
1998 1848 1615 
1999 1827 1538 
2000 1746 1397 
2001 1593 1307 
2002 1508 1307 
2003 1481 1320 
2004 1458 1345 
2005 1458 1338 
Total number of  
firm-year observations 21056 18464 
Total number of  




Table 2 Summary statistics 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for a sample of 18,464 firm-year observations 
of NYSE common stocks from 1993 to 2005. Mean value, standard deviation, the first quartile 
value, median value, and the third quartile value are reported.  
IV is the standard deviation of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ daily returns 
against two lags of, contemporaneous, and two leads of value-weighted return for all common 
stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ within each sample year.  PRIVATE_INFO, 
PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE are the volatility of trading-related efficient price change, trading-
unrelated efficient price change and transitory component in prices respectively. They are 
estimated from the variance decomposition of quoted prices following Hasbrouck (1991) and 
expressed in daily metrics. IV_ROE is the standard deviation of residuals from regressing 
individual stocks’ quarterly ROE against the value-weighted quarterly ROE for all common 
stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ using data of all quarters ending in the previous 
five years. SP500 is a dummy variable taking value 1 for S&P 500 index components and 0 
otherwise. MKTCAP is the market capitalization at the end of previous year. NANALYST is the 
number of analysts making forecasts for a firm during previous year. INSTITUTION is the 
percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding held by the institutional investors at the end of previous 
year. INSDTRD is the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding traded by the insiders during the 
year. 
 
Variable Mean Std. Q1 Median Q3 
IV (%) 2.096 0.983 1.411 1.895 2.549 
PRIVATE_INFO (%) 1.071 0.500 0.766 0.987 1.281 
PUBLIC_INFO (%) 2.233 2.428 1.217 1.642 2.303 
NOISE (%) 1.522 2.011 0.778 1.108 1.573 
IV_ROE (%) 6.448 7.591 2.227 3.863 7.109 
SP500 0.286 0.452 0 0 1 
MKTCAP ($B)  5.198 18.050 0.370 1.034 3.200 
NANALYST 11.991 10.004 4 9 18 
INSTITUTION (%) 54.728 21.982 38.965 56.713 71.307 
INSDTRD (%) 1.645 5.762 0.046 0.243 0.937 
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Table 3 Correlation matrix 
 This table presents the Pearson and Spearman (in lower-left bloc and Italic) correlation coefficients between firm characteristics 
for a sample of 18,464 firm-year observations of NYSE common stocks from 1993 to 2005.  
 IV is the standard deviation of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ daily returns against two lags of, contemporaneous, 
and two leads of value-weighted return for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ within each sample year.  
PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE are the volatility of trading-related efficient price change, trading-unrelated efficient price 
change and transitory component in prices respectively. They are estimated from the variance decomposition of quoted prices following 
Hasbrouck (1991) and expressed in daily metrics. IV_ROE is the standard deviation of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ 
quarterly ROE against the value-weighted quarterly ROE for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ using data of all 
quarters ending in the previous five years. SP500 is a dummy variable taking value 1 for S&P 500 index components and 0 otherwise. 
MKTCAP is the market capitalization at the end of previous year. NANALYST is the number of analysts making forecasts for a firm 
during previous year. INSTITUTION is the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding held by the institutional investors at the end of 
previous year. INSDTRD is the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding traded by the insiders during the year. 
 
 IV PRIVATEINFO 
PUBLIC
INFO NOISE IV_ROE SP500 MKTCAP NANALYST IO INSDTRD
IV  0.761 0.303 0.246 0.279 -0.202 -0.099 -0.148 -0.003 0.080 
PRIVATE 
INFO 0.846  0.469 0.304 0.243 -0.094 -0.008 -0.065 0.033 0.052 
PUBLIC 
INFO 0.742 0.700  0.499 0.076 -0.083 -0.009 -0.088 -0.018 0.013 
NOISE 0.703 0.679 0.741  0.059 -0.039 0.019 -0.047 0.017 0.005 
IV_ROE 0.304 0.285 0.211 0.218  -0.044 -0.049 -0.063 -0.002 0.045 
SP500 -0.235 -0.095 -0.185 -0.131 -0.006  0.352 0.638 0.210 -0.120 
MKTCAP -0.313 -0.148 -0.246 -0.237 -0.124 0.671  0.428 0.034 -0.056 
NANALYST -0.179 -0.055 -0.176 -0.150 -0.054 0.613 0.772  0.252 -0.105 
IO 0.035 0.111 0.017 -0.022 0.034 0.204 0.314 0.310  -0.034 
INSDTRD 0.135 0.099 0.077 0.057 0.037 -0.189 -0.159 -0.135 0.080  
 
Table 4 The comparison of model-based information proxies across firms with different 
frequency of news measured as the number of days with news 
This table presents the result of comparing the values of model-based information proxies 
across firms with different frequency of news using a sample of 1269 common stocks traded on 
NYSE and having news data available on www.MarketWatch.com in 2004.  
NEWSDAYS is the number of days with news appearing on www.MarketWatch.com for 
a firm in 2004. PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE are the volatility of trading-related 
efficient price change, trading-unrelated efficient price change and transitory component in prices 
respectively. They are estimated from the variance decomposition of quoted prices following 
Hasbrouck (1991) and expressed in daily metrics. RATIO_PRIVATE is the ratio of square of 
PRIVATE_INFO to the sum of squares of PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE, and 
RATIO_INFO is the ratio of the sum of squares of PRIVATE_INFO and PUBLIC_INFO to the 
sum of squares of PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE.  
Firms are sorted first into three equally-sized groups based on the market capitalization at 
the end of year 2003 and then into three equally-sized sub-groups within each size group based on 
NEWSDAYS. Panel A reports the mean value of each news group and T-value from T-test of the 
equality of variables between high news firms and low news firms, while panel B reports the 
median value of each news group and Z-value from Wilcoxon rank-sum test of the equality of 
variables between high news firms and low news firms. 
 
Panel A The comparison of mean values 
Frequency of News 
Variables 




NEWSDAYS 39.459 64.374 109.349 NA 
PRIVATE_INFO 0.899 0.976 1.062 6.961 
PUBLIC_INFO 1.478 1.469 1.580 1.193 
NOISE 0.684 0.720 0.814 2.029 
RATIO_PRIVATE 0.284 0.296 0.312 4.865 
RATIO_INFO 0.853 0.854 0.862 1.662 
 
 
Panel B The comparison of median values 
Frequency of News 
Variables 




NEWSDAYS 36 53 84.5 NA 
PRIVATE_INFO 0.816 0.904 1.003 6.972 
PUBLIC_INFO 1.156 1.258 1.345 3.655 
NOISE 0.564 0.616 0.636 2.789 
RATIO_PRIVATE 0.312 0.323 0.325 4.360 
RATIO_INFO 0.868 0.868 0.872 2.050 
 
Table 5 The comparison of model-based information proxies across firms with different 
frequency of news measured as the number of news items 
This table presents the result of comparing the values of model-based information proxies 
across firms with different frequency of news using a sample of 1269 common stocks traded on 
NYSE and having news data available on www.MarketWatch.com in 2004.  
YEARNEWS is the number of news stories appearing on www.MarketWatch.com for a 
firm in 2004. PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE are the volatility of trading-related 
efficient price change, trading-unrelated efficient price change and transitory component in prices 
respectively. They are estimated from the variance decomposition of quoted prices following 
Hasbrouck (1991) and expressed in daily metrics. RATIO_PRIVATE is the ratio of square of 
PRIVATE_INFO to the sum of squares of PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE, and 
RATIO_INFO is the ratio of the sum of squares of PRIVATE_INFO and PUBLIC_INFO to the 
sum of squares of PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE.  
Firms are sorted first into three equally-sized groups based on the market capitalization at 
the end of year 2003 and then into three equally-sized sub-groups within each size group based on 
YEARNEWS. Panel A reports the mean value of each news group and T-value from T-test of the 
equality of variables between high news firms and low news firms, while panel B reports the 
median value of each news group and Z-value from Wilcoxon rank-sum test of the equality of 
variables between high news firms and low news firms. 
 
Panel A The comparison of mean values 
Frequency of News 
Variables 




YEARNEWS 70.110 124.833 343.433 NA 
PRIVATE_INFO 0.877 0.991 1.068 8.171 
PUBLIC_INFO 1.441 1.461 1.625 2.101 
NOISE 0.683 0.723 0.812 1.999 
RATIO_PRIVATE 0.281 0.300 0.310 4.819 
RATIO_INFO 0.849 0.856 0.863 2.467 
 
 
Panel B The comparison of median values 
Frequency of News 
Variables 




YEARNEWS 60 94 167 NA 
PRIVATE_INFO 0.798 0.921 1.000 8.228 
PUBLIC_INFO 1.135 1.253 1.354 4.617 
NOISE 0.557 0.626 0.631 3.055 
RATIO_PRIVATE 0.309 0.323 0.327 4.514 
RATIO_INFO 0.867 0.868 0.872 2.763 
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Table 6 Relation between the model-based information proxies and the frequency of 
news: regression analysis 
This table presents the result of the regression relating the frequency of news with the 
model-based information proxies using a sample of 1269 common stocks traded on NYSE and 








j j i ij
NEWSFREQ a b PRIVATE INFO b PUBLIC INFO b NOISE
c CONTROL ε=




The dependent variable is either NEWSDAYS, the number of days with news appearing 
on www.MarketWatch.com for a firm in 2004, or YEARNEWS, the number of news stories 
appearing on www.MarketWatch.com for a firm in 2004. PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and 
NOISE are the volatility of trading-related efficient price change, trading-unrelated efficient price 
change and transitory component in prices respectively. They are estimated from the variance 
decomposition of quoted prices following Hasbrouck (1991) and expressed in daily metrics. The 
control variables include: 1) MKTCAP, the market capitalization at the end of 2003; and 2) 
industry dummies. Except for the dummy variables, all variables are logarithm transformed. 
Regression coefficients and the associated T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by 
industry (below in Italic) are reported. The coefficients on industry dummies are suppressed for 
convenience. 
 
Dependent variable Independent 
variable NEWSDAYS YEARNEWS 
INTERCEPT 4.000 4.615 
 173.002 136.503 
PRIVATE_INFO 0.382 0.474 
 5.927 4.894 
PUBLIC_INFO -0.010 0.005 
 -0.285 0.075 
NOISE 0.079 0.125 
 2.417 3.314 
MKTCAP 0.319 0.446 
 29.163 28.142 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Adj. Rsq 0.581 0.601 
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Table 7 The comparison of the proxies of private information, public information and 
noise across firms with different idiosyncratic volatility 
This table presents the result of comparing the values of the proxies of private 
information, public information and noise across firms with different idiosyncratic volatility for a 
sample of 18,464 firm-year observations of NYSE common stocks from 1993 to 2005.  
IV is the standard deviation of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ daily returns 
against two lags of, contemporaneous, and two leads of value-weighted return for all common 
stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ within each sample year. PRIVATE_INFO, 
PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE are the volatility of trading-related efficient price change, trading-
unrelated efficient price change and transitory component in prices respectively. They are 
estimated from the variance decomposition of quoted prices following Hasbrouck (1991) and 
expressed in daily metrics. RATIO_PRIVATE is the ratio of square of PRIVATE_INFO to the 
sum of squares of PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE, and RATIO_INFO is the ratio 
of the sum of squares of PRIVATE_INFO and PUBLIC_INFO to the sum of squares of 
PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE.  
Firms are sorted first into three equally-sized groups based on the market capitalization at 
the end of the previous year and then into three equally-sized sub-groups within each size group 
based on IV. Panel A reports the mean value of each IV group and T-value from T-test of the 
equality of variables between high IV firms and low IV firms, while panel B reports the median 
value of each IV group and Z-value from Wilcoxon rank-sum test of the equality of variables 
between high IV firms and low IV firms. 
 
Panel A The comparison of mean values 
IV 
Variables 




IV 1.363 1.963 2.962 NA 
PRIVATE_INFO 0.763 1.021 1.430 81.223 
PUBLIC_INFO 1.837 2.102 2.758 19.809 
NOISE 1.271 1.428 1.867 15.336 
RATIO_PRIVATE 0.189 0.200 0.205 10.014 
RATIO_INFO 0.732 0.736 0.738 2.053 
 
 
Panel B The comparison of median values 
IV 
Variables 




IV 1.307 1.915 2.766 NA 
PRIVATE_INFO 0.737 0.987 1.361 81.795 
PUBLIC_INFO 1.231 1.623 2.176 60.162 
NOISE 0.829 1.109 1.504 55.876 
RATIO_PRIVATE 0.201 0.211 0.214 9.989 
RATIO_INFO 0.749 0.749 0.751 0.476 
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Table 8 Relation between idiosyncratic volatility and private information, public 
information and noise: pool-sample regression analysis 
This table presents the result of the regression relating idiosyncratic volatility with the 
proxies of private information, public information and noise for a sample of 18,464 firm-year 
observations of NYSE common stocks from 1993 to 2005, as specified in the equation below, 
0 1 2 3
,1
* _ * _ *it it it it
J
j j it itj
IV a b PRIVATE INFO b PUBLIC INFO b NOISE
c CONTROL ε=
= + + +
+ +∑ .  
IV is the standard deviation of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ daily returns 
against two lags of, contemporaneous, and two leads of value-weighted return for all common 
stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ within each sample year. PRIVATE_INFO, 
PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE are the volatility of trading-related efficient price change, trading-
unrelated efficient price change and transitory component in prices respectively. They are 
estimated from the variance decomposition of quoted prices following Hasbrouck (1991) and 
expressed in daily metrics. The control variables include: 1) IV_ROE, the standard deviation of 
residuals from regressing individual stocks’ quarterly ROE against the value-weighted quarterly 
ROE for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ using data of all quarters 
ending in the previous five years; 2) SP500, a dummy variable taking value 1 for S&P 500 index 
components and 0 otherwise; 3) MKTCAP, the market capitalization at the end of previous year; 
4) NANALYST, the number of analysts making forecasts for a firm during previous year; 5) 
INSTITUTION, the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding held by the institutional investors at 
the end of previous year; 6) INSDTRD, the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding traded by 
the insiders during the year; 7) Year dummies; and 8) industry dummies. Except for the dummy 
variables, all variables are logarithm transformed.  
In model 1, no control variable other than PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE 
is included in the regression, and all listed control variables are included in the regression in 
model 2. Regression coefficients and the associated T-statistics based on standard errors clustered 
by firm (below in Italic) are reported. The coefficients on year dummies and industry dummies 
are suppressed for convenience. 
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Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 
INTERCEPT 0.586 0.616 
 132.720 19.143 
PRIVATE_INFO 0.737 0.713 
 52.438 37.866 
PUBLIC_INFO 0.102 0.054 
 14.030 8.977 
NOISE 0.072 0.010 
 10.992 2.341 
IV_ROE  0.030 
  8.380 
SP500  -0.084 
  -9.880 
MKTCAP  -0.039 
  -6.467 
NANALYST  0.025 
  3.274 
INSTITUTION  0.013 
  3.013 
INSDTRD  0.002 
  3.233 
Year dummies No Yes 
Industry dummies No Yes 
Adj. Rsq 0.721 0.813 
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Table 9 Relation between idiosyncratic volatility and private information, public 
information and noise: pool-sample dominance analysis 
This table presents the result of dominance analysis which compares the explanatory 
powers of PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE in explaining the cross-sectional 
variation of IV for a sample of 18,464 firm-year observations of NYSE common stocks from 
1993 to 2005.  
 For each variable among PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE, Rsq_sizeK is 
the average increase in R2 by adding this variable to the regression model which has IV as the 
dependent variable and K (K = 0, 1, 2) explanatory variables from the other two variables among 
PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE. Rsq_avg is the average of the mean incremental 
R2 across all model sizes. Panel A reports the results with the original IV as the dependent 
variable, and panel B presents the results with the residual IV, which is the residual from the 
regression of IV against the control variables listed below, as the dependent variable. 
IV is the standard deviation of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ daily returns 
against two lags of, contemporaneous, and two leads of value-weighted return for all common 
stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ within each sample year.  PRIVATE_INFO, 
PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE are the volatility of trading-related efficient price change, trading-
unrelated efficient price change and transitory component in prices respectively. They are 
estimated from the variance decomposition of quoted prices following Hasbrouck (1991) and 
expressed in daily metrics. The control variables include: 1) IV_ROE, the standard deviation of 
residuals from regressing individual stocks’ quarterly ROE against the value-weighted quarterly 
ROE for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ using data of all quarters 
ending in the previous five years; 2) SP500, a dummy variable taking value 1 for S&P 500 index 
components and 0 otherwise; 3) MKTCAP, the market capitalization at the end of previous year; 
4) NANALYST, the number of analysts making forecasts for a firm during previous year; 5) 
INSTITUTION, the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding held by the institutional investors at 
the end of previous year; 6) INSDTRD, the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding traded by 
the insiders during the year; 7) Year dummies; and 8) industry dummies. Except for the dummy 
variables, all variables are logarithm transformed. 
 
Panel A: Original IV as the dependent variable 
Model size PRIVATE_INFO PUBLIC_INFO NOISE 
Rsq_size0 0.691 0.360 0.352 
Rsq_size1 0.357 0.052 0.046 
Rsq_size2 0.290 0.010 0.006 
Rsq_avg. 0.446 0.141 0.135 
 
Panel B: Residual IV as the dependent variable 
Model size PRIVATE_INFO PUBLIC_INFO NOISE 
Rsq_size0 0.389 0.131 0.120 
Rsq_size1 0.264 0.016 0.011 
Rsq_size2 0.238 0.000 0.001 
Rsq_avg. 0.297 0.049 0.044 
 
 68  
Table 10 Relation between idiosyncratic volatility and private information, public 
information and noise: sub-sample regression analysis by sample period 
This table presents the result of the sub-sample regression period by period relating 
idiosyncratic volatility with the proxies of private information, public information and noise for a 
sample of 18,464 firm-year observations of NYSE common stocks from 1993 to 2005. The total 
sample period is divided into three sub-periods: period 1 from 1993 to 1997, period 2 from 1998 
to 2001 and period 3 from 2002 to 2005. A pool regression as specified in the following equation 
is run for each sub-period, 
0 1 2 3
,1
* _ * _ *it it it it
J
j j it itj
IV a b PRIVATE INFO b PUBLIC INFO b NOISE
c CONTROL ε=
= + + +
+ +∑  
IV is the standard deviation of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ daily returns 
against two lags of, contemporaneous, and two leads of value-weighted return for all common 
stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ within each sample year.  PRIVATE_INFO, 
PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE are the volatility of trading-related efficient price change, trading-
unrelated efficient price change and transitory component in prices respectively. They are 
estimated from the variance decomposition of quoted prices following Hasbrouck (1991) and 
expressed in daily metrics. The control variables include: 1) IV_ROE, the standard deviation of 
residuals from regressing individual stocks’ quarterly ROE against the value-weighted quarterly 
ROE for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ using data of all quarters 
ending in the previous five years; 2) SP500, a dummy variable taking value 1 for S&P 500 index 
components and 0 otherwise; 3) MKTCAP, the market capitalization at the end of previous year; 
4) NANALYST, the number of analysts making forecasts for a firm during previous year; 5) 
INSTITUTION, the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding held by the institutional investors at 
the end of previous year; 6) INSDTRD, the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding traded by 
the insiders during the year; 7) Year dummies; and 8) industry dummies. Except for the dummy 
variables, all variables are logarithm transformed.   
 Regression coefficients and the associated T-statistics based on standard errors clustered 
by firm (below in Italic) are reported. The coefficients on year dummies and industry dummies 
are suppressed for convenience. 
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 Sample Period 
Independent variable 1993 - 1997 1998 - 2001 2002 - 2005 
INTERCEPT 0.623 0.592 0.606 
 15.828 17.108 16.178 
PRIVATE_INFO 0.609 0.795 0.838 
 24.806 29.118 54.382 
PUBLIC_INFO 0.086 0.016 0.018 
 8.779 1.781 2.237 
NOISE -0.003 0.020 0.040 
 -0.289 2.607 6.176 
IV_ROE 0.034 0.028 0.024 
 7.555 5.803 5.166 
SP500 -0.107 -0.100 -0.003 
 -9.574 -8.524 -0.298 
MKTCAP -0.034 -0.021 -0.075 
 -3.642 -2.795 -15.878 
NANALYST 0.028 0.021 0.017 
 2.699 1.826 2.459 
INSTITUTION 0.001 0.023 0.001 
 0.246 3.627 0.148 
INSDTRD 0.002 0.004 0.001 
 2.416 2.715 0.912 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. Rsq 0.780 0.786 0.804 
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Table 11 Relation between idiosyncratic volatility and private information, public 
information and noise: sub-sample dominance analysis by sample period 
This table presents the result of sub-sample dominance analysis period by period which 
compares the explanatory powers of PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE in explaining 
the cross-sectional variation of IV for a sample of 18,464 firm-year observations of NYSE 
common stocks from 1993 to 2005. The total sample period is divided into three sub-periods: 
period 1 from 1993 to 1997, period 2 from 1998 to 2001 and period 3 from 2002 to 2005. A 
dominance analysis detailed below is conducted for each sub-period.  
 First, IV is regressed against the control variables detailed below to obtain the residual IV. 
For each variable among PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE, Rsq_sizeK is the 
average increase in R2 by adding this variable to the regression model which has residual IV as 
the dependent variable and K (K = 0, 1, 2) explanatory variables from the other two variables 
among PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE. Rsq_avg is the average of the mean 
incremental R2 across all model sizes.  
 IV is the standard deviation of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ daily returns 
against two lags of, contemporaneous, and two leads of value-weighted return for all common 
stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ within each sample year. PRIVATE_INFO, 
PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE are the volatility of trading-related efficient price change, trading-
unrelated efficient price change and transitory component in prices respectively. They are 
estimated from the variance decomposition of quoted prices following Hasbrouck (1991) and 
expressed in daily metrics. The control variables include: 1) IV_ROE, the standard deviation of 
residuals from regressing individual stocks’ quarterly ROE against the value-weighted quarterly 
ROE for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ using data of all quarters 
ending in the previous five years; 2) SP500, a dummy variable taking value 1 for S&P 500 index 
components and 0 otherwise; 3) MKTCAP, the market capitalization at the end of previous year; 
4) NANALYST, the number of analysts making forecasts for a firm during previous year; 5) 
INSTITUTION, the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding held by the institutional investors at 
the end of previous year; 6) INSDTRD, the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding traded by 
the insiders during the year; 7) Year dummies; and 8) industry dummies. Except for the dummy 
variables, all variables are logarithm transformed. 
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Model size PRIVATE_INFO PUBLIC_INFO NOISE 
Period 1: 1993 - 1997 
Rsq_size0 0.411 0.170 0.308 
Rsq_size1 0.174 0.011 0.079 
Rsq_size2 0.089 0.004 0.001 
Rsq_avg. 0.225 0.062 0.129 
Period 2: 1998 - 2001 
Rsq_size0 0.461 0.148 0.113 
Rsq_size1 0.334 0.028 0.010 
Rsq_size2 0.300 0.001 0.001 
Rsq_avg. 0.365 0.059 0.042 
Period 3: 2002 - 2005 
Rsq_size0 0.437 0.092 0.047 
Rsq_size1 0.370 0.023 0.001 
Rsq_size2 0.348 0.000 0.001 
Rsq_avg. 0.385 0.039 0.017 
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Table 12 Relation between idiosyncratic volatility and private information, public 
information and noise: sub-sample regression analysis by firm size 
This table presents the result of the sub-sample regression by firm size relating 
idiosyncratic volatility with the proxies of private information, public information and noise for a 
sample of 18,464 firm-year observations of NYSE common stocks from 1993 to 2005. Each year 
firms in the sample are classified into three equally-sized groups based on the market 
capitalization at the end of previous year. A pool regression as specified in the equation below is 
run for each size sub-sample, 
0 1 2 3
,1
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IV a b PRIVATE INFO b PUBLIC INFO b NOISE
c CONTROL ε=
= + + +
+ +∑  
IV is the standard deviation of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ daily returns 
against two lags of, contemporaneous, and two leads of value-weighted return for all common 
stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ within each sample year. PRIVATE_INFO, 
PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE are the volatility of trading-related efficient price change, trading-
unrelated efficient price change and transitory component in prices respectively. They are 
estimated from the variance decomposition of quoted prices following Hasbrouck (1991) and 
expressed in daily metrics. The control variables include: 1) IV_ROE, the standard deviation of 
residuals from regressing individual stocks’ quarterly ROE against the value-weighted quarterly 
ROE for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ using data of all quarters 
ending in the previous five years; 2) SP500, a dummy variable taking value 1 for S&P 500 index 
components and 0 otherwise; 3) MKTCAP, the market capitalization at the end of previous year; 
4) NANALYST, the number of analysts making forecasts for a firm during previous year; 5) 
INSTITUTION, the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding held by the institutional investors at 
the end of previous year; 6) INSDTRD, the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding traded by 
the insiders during the year; 7) year dummies; and 8) industry dummies. Except for the dummy 
variables, all variables are logarithm transformed.   
 Regression coefficients and the associated T-statistics based on standard errors clustered 
by firm (below in Italic) are reported. The coefficients on year dummies and industry dummies 
are suppressed for convenience. 
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 Firm Size 
Independent variable Small Medium Large 
INTERCEPT 0.639 0.700 0.458 
 20.481 21.782 3.451 
PRIVATE_INFO 0.668 0.779 0.748 
 43.519 54.816 11.031 
PUBLIC_INFO 0.058 0.050 0.059 
 6.862 5.829 4.856 
NOISE 0.024 0.001 -0.007 
 2.822 0.189 -0.932 
IV_ROE 0.023 0.029 0.036 
 6.186 7.119 4.667 
SP500 -0.022 -0.086 -0.104 
 -0.927 -7.690 -10.925 
MKTCAP -0.023 -0.037 -0.046 
 -4.104 -4.777 -4.178 
NANALYST 0.017 0.025 0.063 
 3.611 4.088 2.264 
INSTITUTION 0.003 -0.003 0.044 
 0.465 -0.368 2.884 
INSDTRD 0.003 0.003 0.001 
 2.817 3.100 0.450 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. Rsq 0.792 0.825 0.802 
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Table 13 Relation between idiosyncratic volatility and private information, public 
information and noise: sub-sample dominance analysis by firm size 
This table presents the result of sub-sample dominance analysis by firm size which 
compares the explanatory powers of PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE in explaining 
the cross-sectional variation of IV for a sample of 18,464 firm-year observations of NYSE 
common stocks from 1993 to 2005. Each year firms in the sample are classified into three 
equally-sized groups based on the market capitalization at the end of previous year. A dominance 
analysis detailed below is conducted for each size sub-sample.  
 First, IV is regressed against the control variables detailed below to obtain the residual IV. 
For each variable among PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE, Rsq_sizeK is the 
average increase in R2 by adding this variable to the regression model which has residual IV as 
the dependent variable and K (K = 0, 1, 2) explanatory variables from the other two variables 
among PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE. Rsq_avg is the average of the mean 
incremental R2 across all model sizes.  
 IV is the standard deviation of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ daily returns 
against two lags of, contemporaneous, and two leads of value-weighted return for all common 
stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ within each sample year. PRIVATE_INFO, 
PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE are the volatility of trading-related efficient price change, trading-
unrelated efficient price change and transitory component in prices respectively. They are 
estimated from the variance decomposition of quoted prices following Hasbrouck (1991) and 
expressed in daily metrics. The control variables include: 1) IV_ROE, the standard deviation of 
residuals from regressing individual stocks’ quarterly ROE against the value-weighted quarterly 
ROE for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ using data of all quarters 
ending in the previous five years; 2) SP500, a dummy variable taking value 1 for S&P 500 index 
components and 0 otherwise; 3) MKTCAP, the market capitalization at the end of previous year; 
4) NANALYST, the number of analysts making forecasts for a firm during previous year; 5) 
INSTITUTION, the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding held by the institutional investors at 
the end of previous year; 6) INSDTRD, the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding traded by 
the insiders during the year; 7) Year dummies; and 8) Industry dummies. Except for the dummy 
variables, all variables are logarithm transformed. 
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Model size PRIVATE_INFO PUBLIC_INFO NOISE 
Small-size firms 
Rsq_size0 0.450 0.164 0.181 
Rsq_size1 0.279 0.019 0.026 
Rsq_size2 0.236 0.001 0.000 
Rsq_avg. 0.322 0.061 0.069 
Medium-size firms 
Rsq_size0 0.385 0.121 0.105 
Rsq_size1 0.273 0.017 0.009 
Rsq_size2 0.248 0.000 0.002 
Rsq_avg. 0.302 0.046 0.039 
Large-size firms 
Rsq_size0 0.290 0.093 0.071 
Rsq_size1 0.209 0.015 0.004 
Rsq_size2 0.191 0.000 0.001 
Rsq_avg. 0.230 0.036 0.025 
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Table 14 Relation between idiosyncratic volatility and private information, public 
information and noise at weekly and monthly horizons: regression analysis 
This table presents the result of the regression relating idiosyncratic volatility at weekly 
and monthly horizon with the proxies of private information, public information and noise for a 
sample of 18,464 firm-year observations of NYSE common stocks from 1993 to 2005, as 
specified in the equation below, 
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For the regression at weekly horizon, IV is measured as the standard deviation of 
residuals from regressing individual stocks’ weekly returns against one lag of, contemporaneous, 
and one lead of value-weighted weekly return for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX 
and NASDAQ within each sample year. PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE are the 
volatility of trading-related efficient price change, trading-unrelated efficient price change and 
transitory component in prices respectively. They are estimated from the variance decomposition 
of quoted prices each year following Hasbrouck (1991) and expressed in daily metrics. The 
control variables include: 1) IV_ROE, the standard deviation of residuals from regressing 
individual stocks’ quarterly ROE against the value-weighted quarterly ROE for all common 
stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ using data of all quarters ending in the previous 
five years; 2) SP500, a dummy variable taking value 1 for S&P 500 index components and 0 
otherwise; 3) MKTCAP, the market capitalization at the end of previous year; 4) NANALYST, 
the number of analysts making forecasts for a firm during previous year; 5) INSTITUTION, the 
percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding held by the institutional investors at the end of previous 
year; 6) INSDTRD, the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding traded by the insiders during the 
year; 7) Year dummies; and 8) industry dummies. Except for the dummy variables, all variables 
are logarithm transformed.   
For the regression at monthly horizon, the total sample period is divided into three sub-
periods: period 1 from 1993 to 1997, period 2 from 1998 to 2001 and period 3 from 2002 to 2005. 
IV is measured as the standard deviation of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ monthly 
returns against one lag of, contemporaneous, and one lead of value-weighted monthly return for 
all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ within each sample period. The set of 
control variables are the same as those in the regression at weekly horizon except that year 
dummies are replaced by sub-period dummies. All explanatory variables except for dummy 
variables are the average values of the corresponding yearly variables defined above within each 
sub-period. SP500 takes value 1 if a firm is one of S&P 500 index components at the beginning 
of each sub-period and 0 otherwise. The value of industry dummies are assigned based on 
industry affiliation at the beginning of each sub-period. Except for the dummy variables, all 
variables are logarithm transformed.  
The regression at weekly horizon is run using all firm-year observations, and the one at 
monthly horizon is run using all firm-period observations. Regression coefficients and the 
associated T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm (below in Italic) are reported. 
The coefficients on year dummies, period dummies and industry dummies are suppressed for 
convenience. 
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 Horizon over which IV is measured 
Independent variable Weekly Monthly 
INTERCEPT 1.346 1.964 
 41.622 43.138 
PRIVATE_INFO 0.683 0.763 
 36.917 28.413 
PUBLIC_INFO 0.056 0.030 
 8.806 2.626 
NOISE 0.007 -0.007 
 1.367 -0.873 
IV_ROE 0.034 0.052 
 8.816 9.805 
SP500 -0.081 -0.070 
 -8.813 -6.206 
MKTCAP -0.045 -0.065 
 -8.057 -8.269 
NANALYST 0.021 0.037 
 2.869 3.286 
INSTITUTION 0.013 0.004 
 2.459 0.485 
INSDTRD 0.003 0.002 
 4.081 1.428 
Year/Period dummies Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Adj. Rsq 0.739 0.764 
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Table 15 Relation between idiosyncratic volatility and private information, public 
information and noise at weekly and monthly horizons: dominance analysis 
This table presents the result of dominance analysis which compares the explanatory 
powers of PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE in explaining the cross-sectional 
variation of IV at weekly and monthly horizon for a sample of 18,464 firm-year observations of 
NYSE common stocks from 1993 to 2005.  
 First, IV is regressed against the control variables detailed below to obtain the residual IV. 
Then for each variable among PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE, Rsq_sizeK is the 
average increase in R2 by adding this variable to the regression model which has residual IV as 
the dependent variable and K (K = 0, 1, 2) variables from the other two variables among 
PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE. Rsq_avg is the average of the mean incremental 
R2 across all model sizes.  
For the analysis at weekly horizon, IV is measured as the standard deviation of residuals 
from regressing individual stocks’ weekly returns against one lag of, contemporaneous, and one 
lead of value-weighted weekly return for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ within each sample year. PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE are the 
volatility of trading-related efficient price change, trading-unrelated efficient price change and 
transitory component in prices respectively. They are estimated from the variance decomposition 
of quoted prices each year following Hasbrouck (1991) and expressed in daily metrics. The 
control variables in the first stage regression include: 1) IV_ROE, the standard deviation of 
residuals from regressing individual stocks’ quarterly ROE against the value-weighted quarterly 
ROE for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ using data of all quarters 
ending in the previous five years; 2) SP500, a dummy variable taking value 1 for S&P 500 index 
components and 0 otherwise; 3) MKTCAP, the market capitalization at the end of previous year; 
4) NANALYST, the number of analysts making forecasts for a firm during previous year; 5) 
INSTITUTION, the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding held by the institutional investors at 
the end of previous year; 6) INSDTRD, the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding traded by 
the insiders during the year; 7) Year dummies; and 8) industry dummies. Except for the dummy 
variables, all variables are logarithm transformed.  
For the analysis at monthly horizon, the total sample period is divided into three sub-
periods: period 1 from 1993 to 1997, period 2 from 1998 to 2001 and period 3 from 2002 to 2005. 
IV is measured as the standard deviation of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ monthly 
returns against one lag of, contemporaneous, and one lead of value-weighted monthly return for 
all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ within each sample period.  The set 
of control variables in the first stage regression are the same as those in the analysis at weekly 
horizon except that year dummies are replaced by sub-period dummies. PRIVATE_INFO, 
PUBLIC_INFO, NOISE and all control variables in the first stage regression are the average of 
corresponding yearly measures defined above within each sample period, except for dummy 
variables. SP500 takes value 1 if a firm is one of S&P 500 index components at the beginning of 
each sub-period and 0 otherwise. The value of industry dummies are assigned based on industry 
affiliation at the beginning of each sub-period. Except for the dummy variables, all variables are 
logarithm transformed.  
The analysis at weekly horizon uses all firm-year observations and its result is reported in 
Panel A, and the one at monthly horizon uses all firm-period observations and its result is 
reported in Panel B.  
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Panel A: Dominance analysis using IV estimated at weekly horizon 
 
Model size PRIVATE_INFO PUBLIC_INFO NOISE 
Rsq_size0 0.312 0.106 0.095 
Rsq_size1 0.211 0.014 0.008 
Rsq_size2 0.190 0.000 0.001 
Rsq_avg. 0.238 0.040 0.035 
 
 
Panel B: Dominance analysis using IV estimated at monthly horizon 
 
Model size PRIVATE_INFO PUBLIC_INFO NOISE 
Rsq_size0 0.283 0.084 0.078 
Rsq_size1 0.203 0.012 0.009 
Rsq_size2 0.184 0.001 0.001 
Rsq_avg. 0.223 0.032 0.029 
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Table 16 Regression analysis relating idiosyncratic volatility with private information, 
public information and noise: measuring IV from the market model using equally-
weighted market return 
This table presents the result of the regression relating idiosyncratic volatility with the 
proxies of private information, public information and noise for a sample of 18,464 firm-year 
observations of NYSE common stocks from 1993 to 2005, as specified in the equation below, 
0 1 2 3
,1
* _ * _ *it it it it
J
j j it itj
IV a b PRIVATE INFO b PUBLIC INFO b NOISE
c CONTROL ε=
= + + +
+ +∑ . 
For the regression at daily horizon, IV is measured as the standard deviation of residuals 
from regressing individual stocks’ daily returns against two lags of, contemporaneous, and two 
leads of equally-weighted return for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
within each sample year. PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE are the volatility of 
trading-related efficient price change, trading-unrelated efficient price change and transitory 
component in prices respectively. They are estimated from the variance decomposition of quoted 
prices following Hasbrouck (1991) and expressed in daily metrics. The control variables include: 
1) IV_ROE, the standard deviation of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ quarterly ROE 
against the equally-weighted quarterly ROE for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ using data of all quarters ending in the previous five years; 2) SP500, a dummy 
variable taking value 1 for S&P 500 index components and 0 otherwise; 3) MKTCAP, the market 
capitalization at the end of previous year; 4) NANALYST, the number of analysts making 
forecasts for a firm during previous year; 5) INSTITUTION, the percentage of a firm’s shares 
outstanding held by the institutional investors at the end of previous year; 6) INSDTRD, the 
percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding traded by the insiders during the year; 7) Year dummies; 
and 8) industry dummies. Except for the dummy variables, all variables are logarithm 
transformed.   
For the regression at weekly horizon, IV is measured as the standard deviation of 
residuals from regressing individual stocks’ weekly returns against one lag of, contemporaneous, 
and one lead of equally-weighted weekly return for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX 
and NASDAQ within each sample year. All explanatory variables are defined in the same way as 
in the analysis at daily horizon. Except for the dummy variables, all variables are logarithm 
transformed.  
For the regression at monthly horizon, the total sample period is divided into three sub-
periods: period 1 from 1993 to 1997, period 2 from 1998 to 2001 and period 3 from 2002 to 2005. 
IV is measured as the standard deviation of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ monthly 
returns against one lag of, contemporaneous, and one lead of equally-weighted monthly return for 
all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ within each sample period. The 
explanatory variables are the same as those in the analysis at daily horizon, except that year 
dummies are replaced by sub-period dummies. All explanatory variables except for dummy 
variables are defined as the average values of the corresponding yearly variables defined above 
within each sub-period. SP500 takes value 1 if a firm is one of S&P 500 index components at the 
beginning of each sub-period and 0 otherwise. The value of industry dummies are assigned based 
on industry affiliation at the beginning of each sub-period. Except for the dummy variables, all 
variables are logarithm transformed.  
The regressions at daily and weekly horizon are run using all firm-year observations, and 
the one at monthly horizon is run using all firm-period observations. Regression coefficients and 
the associated T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm (below in Italic) are reported. 
The coefficients on year dummies, period dummies and industry dummies are suppressed for 
convenience. 
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 Horizon over which IV is measured 
Independent variable Daily Weekly Monthly 
INTERCEPT 0.628 1.355 1.968 
 19.397 41.717 43.213 
PRIVATE_INFO 0.709 0.676 0.744 
 37.994 37.480 28.238 
PUBLIC_INFO 0.053 0.055 0.029 
 8.796 8.821 2.585 
NOISE 0.011 0.008 -0.004 
 2.465 1.582 -0.446 
IV_ROE 0.028 0.031 0.049 
 7.954 8.241 9.325 
SP500 -0.063 -0.061 -0.064 
 -7.549 -6.824 -5.828 
MKTCAP -0.033 -0.037 -0.056 
 -5.314 -6.483 -7.017 
NANALYST 0.025 0.020 0.037 
 3.249 2.687 3.269 
INSTITUTION 0.011 0.013 0.008 
 2.610 2.439 0.844 
INSDTRD 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 3.197 4.162 1.384 
Year/period dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. Rsq 0.814 0.738 0.758 
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Table 17 Regression analysis relating idiosyncratic volatility with private information, 
public information and noise: measuring IV from the industry-augmented market model 
This table presents the result of the regression relating idiosyncratic volatility with the 
proxies of private information, public information and noise for a sample of 18,464 firm-year 
observations of NYSE common stocks from 1993 to 2005, as specified in the equation below, 
0 1 2 3
,1
* _ * _ *it it it it
J
j j it itj
IV a b PRIVATE INFO b PUBLIC INFO b NOISE
c CONTROL ε=
= + + +
+ +∑ . 
For the regression at daily horizon, IV is measured as the standard deviation of residuals 
from regressing individual stocks’ daily returns against two lags of, contemporaneous, and two 
leads of value-weighted return for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
and value-weighted return for all common stocks in the same industry within each sample year. 
PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE are the volatility of trading-related efficient price 
change, trading-unrelated efficient price change and transitory component in prices respectively. 
They are estimated from the variance decomposition of quoted prices following Hasbrouck (1991) 
and expressed in daily metrics. The control variables include: 1) IV_ROE, the standard deviation 
of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ quarterly ROE against the value-weighted 
quarterly ROE for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ and the value-
weighted quarterly ROE for all common stocks in the same industry using data of all quarters 
ending in the previous five years; 2) SP500, a dummy variable taking value 1 for S&P 500 index 
components and 0 otherwise; 3) MKTCAP, the market capitalization at the end of previous year; 
4) NANALYST, the number of analysts making forecasts for a firm during previous year; 5) 
INSTITUTION, the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding held by the institutional investors at 
the end of previous year; 6) INSDTRD, the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding traded by 
the insiders during the year; 7) Year dummies; and 8) industry dummies. Except for the dummy 
variables, all variables are logarithm transformed.   
For the regression at weekly horizon, IV is measured as the standard deviation of 
residuals from regressing individual stocks’ weekly returns against one lag of, contemporaneous, 
and one lead of value-weighted weekly return for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX 
and NASDAQ and value-weighted weekly return for all common stocks in the same industry 
within each sample year. All explanatory variables are defined in the same way as in the analysis 
at daily horizon. Except for the dummy variables, all variables are logarithm transformed.  
For the regression at monthly horizon, the total sample period is divided into three sub-
periods: period 1 from 1993 to 1997, period 2 from 1998 to 2001 and period 3 from 2002 to 2005. 
IV is measured as the standard deviation of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ monthly 
returns against one lag of, contemporaneous, and one lead of value-weighted monthly return for 
all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ and value-weighted monthly return 
for all common stocks in the same industry within each sample period. The explanatory variables 
are the same as those in the analysis at daily horizon, except that year dummies are replaced by 
sub-period dummies. All explanatory variables except for dummy variables are defined as the 
average values of the corresponding yearly variables defined above within each sub-period. 
SP500 takes value 1 if a firm is one of S&P 500 index components at the beginning of each sub-
period and 0 otherwise. The value of industry dummies are assigned based on industry affiliation 
at the beginning of each sub-period. Except for the dummy variables, all variables are logarithm 
transformed.  
The regressions at daily and weekly horizon are run using all firm-year observations, and 
the one at monthly horizon is run using all firm-period observations. Regression coefficients and 
the associated T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm (below in Italic) are reported. 
The coefficients on year dummies, period dummies and industry dummies are suppressed for 
convenience. 
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 Horizon over which IV is measured 
Independent variable Daily Weekly Monthly 
INTERCEPT 0.619 1.316 1.962 
 19.213 39.676 39.446 
PRIVATE_INFO 0.700 0.680 0.773 
 36.915 35.697 26.659 
PUBLIC_INFO 0.057 0.059 0.041 
 9.375 9.119 3.351 
NOISE 0.007 0.001 -0.022 
 1.558 0.172 -2.397 
IV_ROE 0.033 0.038 0.058 
 8.901 9.329 10.100 
SP500 -0.094 -0.088 -0.066 
 -10.381 -8.886 -5.349 
MKTCAP -0.049 -0.055 -0.070 
 -8.232 -9.801 -8.039 
NANALYST 0.016 0.005 0.006 
 2.166 0.629 0.467 
INSTITUTION 0.014 0.016 0.010 
 2.854 2.784 1.009 
INSDTRD 0.002 0.003 0.004 
 3.039 3.843 2.041 
Year/period dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. Rsq 0.803 0.736 0.761 
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Table 18 Regression analysis relating idiosyncratic volatility with private information, 
public information and noise: measuring IV from the Fama-French three factors model 
This table presents the result of the regression relating idiosyncratic volatility with the 
proxies of private information, public information and noise for a sample of 18,464 firm-year 
observations of NYSE common stocks from 1993 to 2005, as specified in the equation below, 
0 1 2 3
,1
* _ * _ *it it it it
J
j j it itj
IV a b PRIVATE INFO b PUBLIC INFO b NOISE
c CONTROL ε=
= + + +
+ +∑ . 
For the regression at daily horizon, IV is measured as the standard deviation of residuals 
from regressing individual stocks’ daily returns against the daily Fama-French three factors 
within each sample year. PRIVATE_INFO, PUBLIC_INFO and NOISE are the volatility of 
trading-related efficient price change, trading-unrelated efficient price change and transitory 
component in prices respectively. They are estimated from the variance decomposition of quoted 
prices following Hasbrouck (1991) and expressed in daily metrics. The control variables include: 
1) IV_ROE, the standard deviation of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ quarterly ROE 
against the value-weighted quarterly ROE for all common stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ using data of all quarters ending in the previous five years; 2) SP500, a dummy 
variable taking value 1 for S&P 500 index components and 0 otherwise; 3) MKTCAP, the market 
capitalization at the end of previous year; 4) NANALYST, the number of analysts making 
forecasts for a firm during previous year; 5) INSTITUTION, the percentage of a firm’s shares 
outstanding held by the institutional investors at the end of previous year; 6) INSDTRD, the 
percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding traded by the insiders during the year; 7) Year dummies; 
and 8) industry dummies. Except for the dummy variables, all variables are logarithm 
transformed.   
For the regression at weekly horizon, IV is measured as the standard deviation of 
residuals from regressing individual stocks’ weekly returns against the weekly Fama-French three 
factors within each sample year. All explanatory variables are defined in the same way as in the 
analysis at daily horizon. Except for the dummy variables, all variables are logarithm transformed. 
For the regression at monthly horizon, the total sample period is divided into three sub-
periods: period 1 from 1993 to 1997, period 2 from 1998 to 2001 and period 3 from 2002 to 2005. 
IV is measured as the standard deviation of residuals from regressing individual stocks’ monthly 
returns against the monthly Fama-French three factors within each sample period. The 
explanatory variables are the same as those in the analysis at daily horizon, except that year 
dummies are replaced by sub-period dummies. All explanatory variables except for dummy 
variables are defined as the average values of the corresponding yearly variables defined above 
within each sub-period. SP500 takes value 1 if a firm is one of S&P 500 index components at the 
beginning of each sub-period and 0 otherwise. The value of industry dummies are assigned based 
on industry affiliation at the beginning of each sub-period. Except for the dummy variables, all 
variables are logarithm transformed.  
The regressions at daily and weekly horizon are run using all firm-year observations, and 
the one at monthly horizon is run using all firm-period observations. Regression coefficients and 
the associated T-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm (below in Italic) are reported. 
The coefficients on year dummies, period dummies and industry dummies are suppressed for 
convenience. 
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 Horizon over which IV is measured 
Independent variable Daily Weekly Monthly 
INTERCEPT 0.614 1.349 0.641 
 19.282 41.563 14.489 
PRIVATE_INFO 0.707 0.681 0.828 
 37.639 36.705 29.947 
PUBLIC_INFO 0.056 0.058 0.028 
 9.246 9.150 2.817 
NOISE 0.008 0.003 -0.009 
 1.765 0.508 -1.495 
IV_ROE 0.031 0.036 0.035 
 8.779 9.115 7.227 
SP500 -0.083 -0.079 -0.058 
 -9.733 -8.400 -6.117 
MKTCAP -0.042 -0.048 -0.034 
 -7.009 -8.595 -3.949 
NANALYST 0.024 0.018 0.031 
 3.252 2.521 2.659 
INSTITUTION 0.012 0.010 0.006 
 2.664 1.830 0.745 
INSDTRD 0.002 0.003 -0.001 
 3.116 4.066 -0.773 
Year/period dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. Rsq 0.810 0.733 0.846 
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